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ARTICLES

A

CAUTIONARY TALE OF THE TRANSPLANT EFFECT ON
INDIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Umakanth Varottil

Duringthe last decade, therehas been a sustained effort on the part of Indian
regulatorsto strengthen corporategovernancenorms. This has been strongly
influenced by developments that occurredin otherparts of the world,particularly
the Sarbanes-OxleyAct in the U.S. and the CadburyCommittee Report in the
U.K. This study reflects upon whether the policies adopted by the Indian
regulatorsare adequateor whether they requiresome mid-course correction.
With that in mind, this Article adopts a revisionistapproachwith the help of two
simple assertions,develops thosefurtherandleaves some foodfor thought leading
to possiblefurtherdetailed normativeresearch. The twin assertionsare: (i) the
broadfeatures of the Indian corporategovernancenorms have been transplanted
from otherjurisdictionssuch as the U.S. and U.K. thatfollow the "outsider"
model ofcorporategovernance, andhence those norms are not likely to be suitable
for implementation in addressinggovernanceproblems in India, whichfollows
the "insider" model; and (ii) recent events involving the collapse of several
leadingfinancialinstitutionsprovide evidence, at least anecdotal in nature,that
the corporategovernancenorms followed in the U.S. and U.K. have not been
effective in preventinglarge-scalecorporategovernancefailures, thereby raising
questions about the efficacy of that model in the Indian context.
Through these assertions, this Article makes the case that the source for
strengtheningIndiancorporategovernancelies within. Seeking out othersystems
B.A., LL.B (Hons.), National Law School of India University, Bangalore, LL.M
(Corporations), New York University School of Law; PhD Candidate, Faculty of
Law, National University of Singapore. I thank Shaun Mathew, Nuggehalli Nigam,
Jayant Thakur and Hans Tjio for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of
this Article. I am also grateful to the panelists (Roel Campos, John C. Coffee,
Vikramaditya S. Khanna and Michael Useem) as well as participants at the panel
discussion entitled "Beyond Satyam: Analyzing India's CorporateGovernance" organized
by the Jindal Global Law School in New York on February 4, 2009, whose insights
have been invaluable in refining several positions adopted in this Article. Needless
to say, any errors or omissions remain mine alone.
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of corporategovernanceto emulate will only lead tofurther incongruity with
the traditionalbusiness systems and practices that are replete in India, and
unnecessarilyadd to the eclecticism that persistsin Indiancorporategovernance.
While the empirical evidence on the impact ofcorporategovernance reforms in
India is promising,the anecdotal evidence is less optimistic and the recent
accountingirregularitiesat Satyam Computers beartestimony to thatfact. This
Article callsfor a model ofgovernance that resonateswell with Indianbusiness
values andpracticesfrom the standpointof economic, social, and politicalfactors.
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Cautionary Tale of the Transplant Effect on Indian Corporate Governance
"In proposingto apply the juristicrules of a distant time or country to the
conditionsofa particularplace at the present day regardmust be had to the
physical, social, andhistoricalconditionsto which that rule is to be adapted"'

1. INTRODUCTION
The concept of corporate governance has acquired tremendous significance
in modern corporate law. The aftermath of corporate scandals at Enron,
WorldCom, and Parmalat, the collapse of financial services giants such as Bear
Stearns, Lehman Brothers and AIG, and more recently, the massive accounting
fraud at India's Satyam Computers, underscore the need for proper governance
of companies so as to protect the interests of their owners and other stakeholders.
Corporate governance relates to the "system by which companies aredirected and
controlled".2It represents the set of checks and balances within the corporate structure
that helps create long-term value enhancement for stakeholders in a company.3 Delving
deeper into the structure of a modem company, we find that corporate governance,
in its simple terms, "concerns the relationshipsbetween a company's owners, managers,
board of directors (BOD), and other stakeholders".4 The study of the interrelationship
among these four constituencies strikes at the heart of corporate governance.
While the concept of corporate governance has been existent, albeit in
different and possibly amorphous forms, in the developed world (particularly in
the U.S.) for over half a century now, it is a relatively recent phenomenon in
India. Corporate governance came to the fore in the Indian business context only
in the late 1990s,6 and it was stipulated as a matter of law only in 2000.7 However,
since then, there has been a sustained effort on the part of Indian regulators to
strengthen corporate governance norms and to induce more stringent governance

2

5
6

7

Srinath Roy v. Dinabandhu Sen, 42 I.A. 221, 241, 243 [Privy Council] cited from M.P.
JAIN, OurLINES OF INDIAN LEGAL HISTORY 441 (N. M. Tripathi, 1993).
Financial Reporting Council, Report Of The Committee On The Financial Aspects Of
CorporateGovernance, ' 2.5 (1992) availableat http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/
cadbury.pdf [hereinafter "Cadbury Committee Report"].
See, R.A.G. MONKS & N. MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2 (Blackwell Publishing, 1995).
F. A. Gul & J.S.L. Tsui, Introduction and Overview in THE GOVERNANCE OF EAST ASIAN
CORPORATIONS: PoST ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 3 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

See, Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise ofIndependent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005:
Of ShareholderValue and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007).
The first formal effort towards enhancement of Indian corporate governance is
embodied in Confederation of Indian Industry, Desirable Corporate Governance: A
Code (1998) available at http://www.acga-asia.org/public/files/CIICode_1998.pdf
[hereinafter "CII Code"].
Securities and Exchange Board of India, SMDRP/POLICY/CIR-10/2000 dated Feb.
21, 2000, available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/circulars/2000/CIR102000.html.
3
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practices among Indian listed companies. These initiatives have been strongly
influenced by developments that occurred in other parts of the world. Clause 49
of the Equity Listing Agreement [hereinafter "Clause 49"] encapsulates India's
corporate governance norms, and owes its genesis to the Cadbury Committee
Report in the U.K. from which it drew broad principles.' Subsequent revisions to
Clause 49 can be primarily attributed as a reaction to the Sarbanes Oxley Act of
2002 [hereinafter "SOX"] in the U.S."
With ten years having elapsed since the initial concrete efforts to enhance
corporate governance in India and given the wide-ranging nature of discussions
regarding corporate governance reforms stemming from the Satyam crisis, it is an
opportune time to review the impact of various measures on the Indian corporate
sector. Of course, it is hard to argue against the need for enhanced governance in
Indian companies (and that is not at all my goal here), but it is worthwhile to reflect
upon whether the policies pursued by the Indian authorities are adequate or whether
they require some mid-course correction. With that in mind, I adopt in this article a
revisionist approach with the help of two simple assertions, develop those further in
the course of this article and leave some food for thought leading to possible further
detailed normative research. My twin assertions are:
(i)

The broad features of Indian corporate governance norms have been
transplanted from other jurisdictions such as the U.S. and U.K. that follow
a particular model of corporate governance, viz., the "outsider" model" of

The Equity Listing Agreement [hereinafter the "Listing Agreement"] is a
contractual document that is executed between a company desirous of listing its
securities and the stock exchanges where the securities are to be listed. The
execution of the Listing Agreement is a pre-condition of listing securities on a
stock exchange. Since the format of the Listing Agreement is prescribed by India's
securities regulator, the Securities and Exchange Board of India, all stock exchanges
are required to follow the standard Listing Agreement, and hence its terms do not
vary from one stock exchange to another. The standard form of the Listing
Agreement is available at http://www.nseindia.com/content/equitieseq listagree.zip.
See also, Section 21, Securities (Contracts) Regulation Act, 1956, which provides
that a company that applies for listing of securities on a stock exchange shall
9

1o

comply with the provisions of the Listing Agreement.
See, B. Cheffins, CorporateGovernance Reform: Britain as an Exporter, 8 HuME PAPERs ON
PuBuc PoucY: CORPORATE GovERNANcE AND THE REFORM OF THE COMPANY LAW 10 (2000),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-215950.
It is a different matter that both the Cadbury Committee Report and SOX have
heavily influenced corporate governance norms in other countries around the

world. See, J. Dahya & J.J. McConnell, Board Composition, Corporate Performance, and
the Cadbury Committee Recommendation 1 (2005), available at http://ssrn.com/

11

abstract-687429, S. Harter-Bachmann, Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Have the Americans Set
CapitalMarket Standards 27(2) CoMp. L. 35 (2006).
The outsider model of corporate governance is represented by companies with
diffused shareholding whereby a large number of shareholders hold a small number
of shares each, with none of them holding a dominant or controlling stake in the
company. For a detailed discussion on this model, see, infra Part IIIA.
4
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corporate governance, and hence those norms are not likely to be suitable
for implementation in addressing governance problems in India, which
follows the "insider"model."
(ii)

Recent events provide evidence, at least anecdotal in nature, that the
corporate governance norms followed in the U.S. and U.K. have not been
effective in preventing large-scale corporate governance failures,"
thereby raising questions about that model itself. Therefore, even
assuming that model of corporate governance is suitable in the Indian
context, its efficacy may still be in considerable doubt.

Through these assertions, I argue that the source for strengthening Indian
corporate governance lies within. Seeking out other systems of corporate
governance to emulate 4 will only lead to further incongruity with traditional
business systems and practices that are replete in India, and unnecessarily add
to the eclecticism"s that persists in Indian corporate governance. What is required
is a model of governance that resonates well with Indian business values and
practices from the standpoint of social, cultural and political factors. A model
that meets with the understanding of Indian businesses may be implemented
more optimally compared to other models.

The insider model of corporate governance is represented by companies with
concentrated shareholding whereby a single shareholder or group of shareholders
holds a dominant and controlling stake in the company. For a detailed discussion
on this model, see, infra Part IIB.
13 During the year 2008 alone, several U.S. corporations such as Bear Stearns, Lehman
Brothers, Freddie Mac, Fannie May, Merrill Lynch and AIG saw a massive fall in
their stock prices thereby severely hurting the interest of their investors. Similarly,
the U.K. witnessed the collapse of the Northern Trust Bank. Allegations are rife
that the boards of directors and the corporate governance mechanisms established

12

within these companies did not foresee the oncoming financial crisis and take
measures to ameliorate its impact. See, for e.g., Julie MacIntosh, Lehman Insiders
Question Clout of Board, FINANCIAL TD Es, Sept. 16, 2008, John Schnatter, Where Were
the Boards?, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (EAsTERN EDmoN), Oct. 25, 2008, at A.11.
14

15

There have been several calls in academic literature for India to adopt a more
stringent regime including by appropriately borrowing from SOX, although with a

caveat that these have to be tailored to suit Indian needs. See, S. Mohanty, SarbanesOxley: Can One Model FitAll?, 12 NEw ENG. J.INT'L & COMP. L. 231 (2006), T.Mazumdar,
Where the Traditional and Modern Collide: Indian Corporate Governance Law, 16 TUL. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 243 (2007).
Eclecticism refers to the practice of drawing (usually the best aspects) from various
doctrines, methods or styles. See, K. Yoshino, The Eclectic Model of Censorship, 88 CAL.
L. REv. 1635, 1638 (2000) (referring to the "historical use of that word to denominate the
class of philosophers who adopted whatever philosophical doctrines pleased them without
much attention to the distinctions between the schools from which the doctrines emanated").
5

NationalLaw School ofIndia Review

Vol. 21(1
M

2009

Part II of this Article outlines the current system of corporate governance
in India and sheds light on some key developments. Part III discusses the concepts
of the outsider model of corporate governance (with the U.S. and U.K. being
prime examples) and the insider model (with India being the subject matter of
study). Part IV studies the concept of, and problems with, legal transplants, and
analyzes the outcome of transplants in Indian corporate governance. Part V
examines the concept of convergence in corporate governance, reviews the
plausible reasons for the recent failure of governance in several U.S. companies
and contrasts that with the position subsisting under Indian corporate law
(much of which predates Clause 49). Part VI concludes with some pointers
towards possible further research.

II. A

PRIMER ON INDIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

A. Key Developments'"
Since its independence in 1947, India's corporate governance regime has
witnessed two distinct eras. The first is the pre-1991 era, which is embodied in
company law that was inherited from the British. Company law was
substantially overhauled about a decade after independence when it took the
form of the Companies Act, 1956. During this era, the focus was predominantly
on the manufacturing sector. The then prevalent license-raj and industrial
capacity quota system ensured that only a few businesses thrived.1 This led to
the growth of certain business families and industrial groups (largely to the
exclusion of others) that held large chunks of capital in publicly listed companies
as well. Finance was essentially available only through banking channels (as
opposed to the capital markets). The banks and development financial institutions
took up large shareholdings in companies and also nominated directors on the
boards of such companies. During this era, due to concentrated ownership of
shares, the controlling shareholders, which were primarily business families or
the State, continued to exert great influence over companies at the cost of minority
shareholders. Governance structures were opaque as financial disclosure norms
were poor.

16

For a more detailed analysis on the historical developments in Indian corporate
governance, see, R. Chakrabarti, Corporate Governance in India - Evolution and
Challenges, 14-20 (2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=649857, N
Balasubramanian et al, Firm-Level Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets: A Case

17

Study of India, 5-6 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=992529, V. Bhat,
CorporateGovernance in India: Past, Present,and Suggestions for the Future, 92 IOWA L.
REV. 1429, 1437-40 (2007).
The origins of this approach can be traced to the Industries (Development and
Regulation) Act, 1951 and the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956. See, R. Chakrabarti
et al, CorporateGovernance in India, 20(1) J.APP. CORP. FIN. 59, 62 (2008).
6
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Signs of change, however, rapidly emerged with the 1991 reforms through
economic liberalisation" that led to a new era in Indian corporate governance.
The year 1992 witnessed the establishment of the Securities and Exchange Board
of India [hereinafter "SEBI"], the Indian securities markets regulator." SEBI rapidly
began ushering in securities market reforms that gradually led to corporate
governance reforms as well. Curiously, the first corporate governance initiative
was sponsored by industry. In 1998, a National Task force constituted by the
Confederation of Indian Industry [hereinafter "CII"] recommended a code for
"DesirableCorporateGovernance," which was voluntarily adopted by a few companies. 2 0
Thereafter, a committee chaired by Mr. Kumar Mangalam Birla submitted a report to
SEBI "to promote and raisethe standardof CorporateGovernancein respectof listed companies".2
Based on the recommendations of the Kumar Mangalam Birla committee, the new
Cause 49, containing norms for corporate governance, was inserted in 2000 into the
22
Listing Agreement that was applicable to all listed companies of a certain size.
Although both the CII Code as well as the Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee Report
expressly cautioned against mechanically importing forms of corporate governance
from the developed world," several concepts introduced by them were indeed those
that emerged in countries such as the U.S. and U.K. These include concepts such as
an independent board and audit committee.
1s

19
20

Radical reforms were occasioned in 1991 due to the exceptionally severe balance
of payments crisis and dismal growth. See, M. S. Ahluwalia, Economic Reforms in India
Since 1991: Has GradualismWorked? in INDrA's ECONoMIC TRANSITION: THE POLIrIcs or REFORMS
87 (R.Mukherji ed., Oxford University Press, 2007), A. 0. Krueger & S. Chinoy, The
Indian Economy in Global Context in EcoNoMIc POLICY REFORMS AND THE INDIAN EcoNomy 21

(A. 0. Krueger ed., University of Chicago Press, 2003).
SEBI was established under the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992.
CII Code, supra note 6. The CIT Code, which was directed at large companies,
contained some of the measures that continue to date, such as the appointment of

a minimum number of non-executive independent directors, an independent audit
committee, the unimpeded flow of key information to the board of directors and
norms for corporate disclosures to shareholders.
21

See, Securities and Exchange Board of India, Report of the Kumar Mangalam Birla
Committee on Corporate Governance (2000), available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/
commreport/corpgov.html [hereinafter "Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee
Report"]. This report built upon the pattern established by the CII Code and

recommended that "under Indian conditions a statutory rather than voluntary code
would be far more purposive and meaningful, at least in respect of essentialfeatures of
corporate governance". Id., at 1 1.7. For a detailed discussion regarding the transition
from the CII Code to the Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee Report see, B.S. Black
&V. S. Khanna, Can CorporateGovernanceReforms IncreaseFirms'MarketValues? Evidence
from India, 4 J. EMPIRIcAL STuo. (2007), availableat http:!!ssrn.com/abstract-914440.
22

23

Securities and Exchange Board of India, SMDRP/POLICY/CIR-10/2000 dated Feb.
21, 2000, available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/circulars/2000/CIR102000.html. Clause
49 contained a schedule of implementation whereby it was applicable at the outset
to large companies and newly listed companies, and thereafter to smaller
companies over a defined timeframe.
CII Code, supra note 6, at 1; Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee Report, supra note
21, at 1 2.6.

7
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Thereafter, following Enron and other global scandals, SEBI decided to
strengthen Indian corporate governance norms. In the wake of the enactment of
SOX in the U.S., SEBI appointed the Narayana Murthy Committee to examine
Clause 49 and recommend changes to the existing regime. 2 4 Following the

recommendations of the Narayana Murthy Committee, SEBI, on October 29, 2004,
issued a revised version of Clause 49 that was to come into effect on April 1,
2005.25 However, since a large number of companies were unprepared to be fully
compliant with such stringent requirements, SEBI extended the date of compliance
to December 31, 2005.26 Hence, detailed corporate governance norms were
introduced into Indian corporate regulations only from January 1, 2006.27 Clause
49 in its present form provides for the following key features of corporate
governance: 28
(i)

2

25

26

27

boards of directors of listed companies must have a minimum number of
independent directors, with independence being defined in a detailed
manner;29

Securities and Exchange Board of India, Report of the SEBI Committee on Corporate
Governance (2003), available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/commreport/corpgov.pdf
[hereinafter "Narayana Murthy Committee Report"]. The need for a review of
Clause 49 was in part triggered by events that occurred in the U.S. at the turn of
the century, such as the collapse of Enron and WorldCom. See, Narayana Murthy
Committee Report, id., at 1[ 1.6.1. Considerable emphasis was placed in this report
on financial disclosures, financial literacy of audit committee members as well as
on chief executive officer (CEO) and chief financial officer (CFO) certification, all
of which are matters similar to those dealt with by SOX.
Securities and Exchange Board of India, SEBI/CFD/DIL/CG/1/2004/12/10 dated Oct.
29, 2004, available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/circulars/2004/cfdcir104.pdf.
Securities and Exchange Board of India, SEB/CFD/DIL/CG/1/2005/29/3 dated Mar.
29, 2005, available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/circulars/2005/dil105.html.
These norms have been subjected to some periodic amendments and clarifications
thereafter. See, Securities and Exchange Board of India, SEBI/CFD/DIL/CG/1/2008/
08/04 dated Apr. 8, 2008; Securities and Exchange Board of India, SEBI/CFD/DIL/
CG/2/2008/23/10 dated Oct. 23, 2008; Securities and Exchange Board of India, SEBI/

CFD/DIL/LA/2009/3/2 dated Feb. 3, 2009.
28

Clause 49 applies to all listed companies (or those that are seeking listing), except
for very small companies (being those that have a paid-up capital of less than Rs.
30 million and net worth of less than Rs. 250 million throughout their history). While
several requirements of Clause 49 are mandatory in nature, there are certain

requirements (such as remuneration committee, training of board members and
29

whistle blower policy) that are merely recommendatory in nature. See, SEBI Circular
dated Oct. 29, 2004, supra note 25.
Where the Chairman is an executive or a promoter or related to a promoter or a
senior official, then at least one-half the board should comprise independent
directors; in other cases, independent directors should constitute at least onethird of the board size. Clause 49(L)(A) of the Listing Agreement. In order for A
director to qualify as "independent", the general test is that apart from receiving
8
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(ii)

listed companies must have audit committees of the board with a
minimum of three directors, two-thirds of whom must be independent; 0
the roles and responsibilities of the audit committee are specified in
detail'

(iii) listed companies must periodically make various disclosures regarding
financial and other matters to ensure transparency; 32
(iv) the CEO and CFO of listed companies must (a) certify that the financial
33
statements are fair and (b) accept responsibility for internal controls;
and
(v)

annual reports of listed companies must carry status reports about
compliance with corporate governance norms.34

However, there are some existing proposals to reform some of these
corporate governance provisions, specifically those relating to independent
directors, under the Companies Bill, 2008, which is pending in Parliament.35

B. MotivatingFactorsbehindthe CorporateGovernanceDrive
The drive towards a more stringent corporate governance regime over the
last decade can be attributed to two factors, viz., (i) the internationalization of
Indian capital markets, and (ii) cross-listings by Indian companies. Beginning
with the phenomenon of internationalization, a review of the pre-1991 era
indicates that the capital markets were heavily regulated,3 6 thereby impeding

30
31
32
3
3
5

36

director's remuneration, the person does not have any material pecuniary
relationships or transactions with the company, its promoters, its directors, its
senior management or its holding company, its subsidiaries and associates which
may affect independence of the director. There are additional circumstances
detailed in Clause 49(1)(A) of the Listing Agreement where a director would be
presumed not to be independent if certain conditions are attracted.
Clause 49(II)(A) of the Listing Agreement.
Clause 49(IJ)(D) of the Listing Agreement.
Clause 49(IV) of the Listing Agreement.
Clause 49(V) of the Listing Agreement.
Clause 49(VI) of the Listing Agreement.
The concept of "independent director" is proposed under the Bill to be introduced
in the Companies Act for the first time. Companies that have a prescribed minimim
share capital are required to have at least one-third of their board consist of
independent directors. This will be a uniform requirement and the distinction
between companies with executive chairman and non-executive chairman will be
removed. See, section 132(3), Companies Bill, 2008.
All securities offerings to the public required the approval of the Controller of
Capital Issues [hereinafter "CCI"], which effectively micro-managed offerings
including by reviewing the details such as price at which securities were to be
offered rather than leaving those to the market forces to determine.

9

Vol. 21 (1)

NationalLaw School ofIndia Review

2009

foreign investors from investing in the Indian markets. However, with the
liberalization of the Indian economy in 1991 and the consequent promotion of capital
market activity by SEBI, a simplified process became available to Indian companies
to access capital from the public.37 Simultaneously, the foreign investment regime
was relaxed thereby increasing the avenues available to foreign investors to
participate in Indian capital markets. These measures signify the objective of the
Indian Government during the turn of the century to attract foreign capital so as to
make its securities markets more competitive among emerging markets."
In addition, Indian companies themselves found it essential to issue
securities to investors in other countries to meet their capital needs. When Indian
companies undertook public offerings of securities in India with listings on Indian
stock exchanges, a significant portion of the investments came from offshore
investors. Due to this phenomenon, Indian companies (at least those raising capital
market finance) were persuaded to comply with corporate governance norms that
most investors around the world understood in order for the securities offerings to
be successfully marketed overseas. 40 Companies therefore had to depart from their
own norms and meet standards in other countries from where they received
investments. Since a large portion of such foreign investment came from the
developed world (primarily the U.S. and U.K.), it became convenient for companies
41
to adopt standards with which investors from those countries were familiar.
Such a move was aided by the Government through imposition of corporate
governance norms (in the form of Clause 49) that met with industry demands.
3

38

The office of the CCI was abolished in 1992 by the Capital Issues (Control) Repeal
Act, 1992. Furthermore, SEBI effected a series of capital market reforms in the late
1990s streamlining the public offering process. Significant measures include the
introduction of the bookbuilding process for price discovery, dematerialization of
securities (and the consequent availability of scripless trading) and the use of
"shelf prospectus". All of these helped stimulate greater capital market activity in
India. See, J.Armour & P. Lele, Law, Finance,and Politics: The Case of India, 18-20 (ECGI
Working Paper Series in Law, Working Paper No. 107/2008, 2008), available at http:/
/ssrn.com/abstract=1116608.
Significant changes in the foreign investment regime include the enactment of the
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and the availability of the automatic
route for foreign investment in most sectors up to specified shareholding
percentages. Government of India, Ministry of Industry, (Department of Industrial
Policy & Promotion, Press Note No. 2, 2000 Series). See also, R. Sachdev, Comparing the

Legal Foundationsof Foreign DirectInvestment in India and China: Law and the Rule of Law
in the Indian Foreign Direct Investment Context, COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 167, 200-04 (2006).
S9

See, Mazumdar, supra note 14, at 253.

4

See, R. Gupta, Reforms Made and Reforms Needed in India's Capital Markets: Issues Facing

4

U.S. Investors, 1650 PLI CoRP. 85 (2008).
Several U.S. pension funds, who are activist investors, began investing significant
sums of money in the Indian stock markets. Vikas Dhoot, Pension Funds from Across

the World Flock to Dalal Street While India Still Waits, Indian Express, Jan. 13, 2008
10
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Moving on to the cross-listing factor, while the Indian capital markets
were becoming international, Indian companies began listing overseas in order
to raise capital. By the late 1990s, it was common for Indian companies to issue
their securities through global depository receipts (GDRs) that were listed on the
London or Luxembourg stock exchange. The event that marks a watershed in
cross-listings by Indian companies is the listing of American depository receipts
(ADRs) by Infosys, the Indian information technology bellwether, on the NASDAQ
Stock Market [hereinafter "NASDAQ"] in 1999.42 As a result of its NASDAQ
listing, Infosys submitted itself to the full-blown corporate governance
requirements applicable to foreign listings on NASDAQ. 43 Apart from seeking
capital at better valuations, overseas listings were also driven by the desire of
companies to build credibility and reputation in international markets.4 4 Greater
numbers of offshore listings by Indian companies compelled such companies to
adhere to norms and practices of corporate governance applicable to markets
where they listed their securities. Consequently, those norms and practices
permeated into the general Indian corporate scenario, at least among the leading
and more reputable companies.

42

3

(noting that "as many as 152 global pensionfunds from 18 countries are here and the number
is growingfast"). Even the California State employees' pension fund (referred to as
CalPERS), renowned for its activism in instilling corporate governance standards
in its portfolio companies, commenced investment in the Indian stock markets in
2004. Dhammika Dharmapala & Vikramaditya Khanna, Corporate Governance,
Enforcement, and Firm Value: Evidence from India, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract-1105732, 18-19 (2008). This phenomenon is not peculiar to India, but
generally applies to most emerging markets. Further, there also tends to be
competition among emerging markets to make their regimes attractive to foreign
investors so that foreign capital is not diverted to other countries. Professors
Gordon and Roe note that the result of internationalization of capital markets to
emerging market economies is that "investment flows may move againstfirms perceived
to have suboptimalgovernance and thus to the disadvantageof the countries in which those
firms arebased" CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE INCORPORATE GOVERNANcE 2 (J.N. Gordon &
M.J. Roe eds., Cambridge University Press, 2004).
T. Khanna & K. Palepu, Globalizationand Convergence in CorporateGovernance:Evidence
from Infosys and the Indian Software Industry, 35 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 484, 489 (2004).
This sparked off somewhat of a trend, and as of December 2008, there are 16
Indian companies listed on the U.S. stock exchanges (3 on NASDAQ and 13 on
NYSE) and hence subject to SOX and other U.S. corporate governance
requirements. See, NASDAQ International Listing, available at http://
www.nasdaq.com/asp/NonUsOutput.asp?page=I&region=asia; NYSE Euronext,
available at http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/lc_all_region_7.html?country=3.
Khanna & Palepu, supra note 42, at 484 (commenting that "[t]he success and generally
positive reputation of India's software firms ... provides at least surface credence to the idea
that the global markets to which these firms are exposed has affected their governance
systems"). See also, A. N. Licht, Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance: Bonding or
Avoiding?, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 141, 142 (2003) (referring to this concept as the "bonding
thesis" and noting that "cross-listing on a foreign stock market can serve as a bonding
mechanism for corporate insiders to commit credibly to a better governance regime").
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These motivating factors reveal that apart from the general desire to
enhance governance and transparency among Indian companies, the
developments in Indian corporate governance since 1991 were also largely driven
by the need to attract foreign capital into the Indian markets which indicates the
trend to borrow, willy-nilly, well-understood concepts of corporate governance
from the developed economies such as the U.S. and U.K.45

III. MODELS

OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

As we have seen, several concepts in corporate governance (such as
independent directors, audit committee and CEO/CFO certification, just to name
a few) originated largely in the U.S. and U.K., and were thereafter exported to
other countries such as India."6 A key question that arises for consideration is
whether these concepts can be implemented across various jurisdictions with
4

Admittedly, the direct evidence of borrowing by the Indian regulators from the
U.S. or U.K. corporate governance regimes is scanty. In fact, both the CII Code as
well as the Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee Report expressly cautioned against
borrowing from other regimes keeping in view the special circumstances that are
applicable to the Indian corporate sector. See, supra note 23 and accompanying
text. However, that is not to say that connections do not exist. Due regard must be
had to the fact that the recommendations of the committees that advised SEBI on
this issue were likely influenced by developments that occurred throughout the
world (but primarily in the U. S. and U. K.) during the period between 1998 and 2004
when the initial round of corporate governance reforms in India were underway.
These include the sustained discussion surrounding the Cadbury Committee Report
in the U. K. and the enactment of SOX in the U. S. As one commentator observes,
the "similarities [of Indian corporategovernance norms] with Sarbanes Oxley and other
governance reforms around the globe should be obvious." George S. Geis, Can Independent
Blockholding Play Much of a Role in Indian CorporateGovernance? 3 CORP. GOVERNANCE L.
REV. 283, 284 (2007).

In fact, the review of corporate governance norms by the Narayana Murthy
Committee was occasioned by the developments in the U. S. following Enron. See,
supra note 24 and accompanying text. Given these circumstances, the fact that the

committees recommended (and SEBI adopted) measures such as independent
directors, audit committees and CEO/CFO certification, all of which constitute the
fulcrum of corporate governance norms in the U. S. and U. K., provides ample

support to the borrowing or transplant argument. In a recent interview, Mr.
Narayana Murthy stated:

My committee on corporate governance came out with a set of recommendations

46

based on the best practices in many parts of the world and India. We talked about
the whistle-blower policy, related-party transactions, need for independent
directors to be truly independent, tenure of non-executive directors, CEO-and
CFO-certification on the lines of Sarbanes-Oxley, oversight of subsidiaries.
Subir Roy, 'We Have to Make Respect Respectable' - Q&A: N R Narayana Murthy,
Chairman and Chief Mentor of Infosys Technologies, BUSINEss STANDARD, Feb. 27, 2009.
Id.
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ease or whether there are any fundamental differences in jurisdictions so as to
make them conducive for implementation in some (primarily the countries where
they originated), but not in others. That naturally leads us in this Part to a study
of the differences in corporate governance systems in various countries, which
develops my first assertion that norms of corporate governance from jurisdictions
such as U.S. and U.K. will not be entirely suitable for addressing corporate
governance problems in India.
There is a growing body of literature that focuses on systems of corporate
governance that has shaped an intense debate on whether there is likely to be
global convergence of corporate governance" or whether individual legal, social
and political factors would drive countries away from such convergence48 and
compel them to maintain distinct systems resulting in divergence. Before
examining issues of convergence or divergence, it would be essential to review
the types of corporate governance models. For this purpose, I draw upon the
bifurcation of corporate governance systems made by Nestor and Thompson
into two basic models: the "outsider" model and the "insider" model.49

A. The Outsider Model of Corporate Governance
The outsider model displays dispersed share ownership with large
institutional shareholdings." This essentially tracks the Berle and Means
Corporation wherein dispersion in the ownership of companies is inherent in the
corporate system,"' due to which "the positionof ownershiphas changedfrom that of an
4

H. Hansmann & R. Kraakman, The End of History for CorporateLaw in GORDON & ROE,
supra note 41, at 33 (predicting and arguing for a convergence of corporate
governance regimes around the world on the lines of the model that exists in the

U. S. and U. K.).
4

4

so
51

L. A. Bebchuk & M. J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and
Governance in GORDON & ROE, supra note 41, at 69 (arguing that ownership structures
in economies with controlling shareholding will have persistence due to efficiency
reasons and owing to internal rent-seeking that might impede changes to the
structure of corporate rules); Z. Goshen, Controlling CorporateAgency Costs: A United
States-IsraeliComparativeView, 6 CARDozo J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 99, 102 (1998) (stating that
"it is reasonable that the corporatelaw of a given country would contain provisions aimed at
solving the agency problems which are characteristicof that particularcountry"); MONKS &
MINNOW, supra note 3, at 298 ("observing an agreement among commentators that there
can be no "one size fits all" standard, and that other countries' practices cannot be
transplantedor imposed on a country and that "individual companies and markets will
always be subject to local cultures, pressures and practices").
S. Nestor & J. K. Thompson, Corporate Governance Patterns in OECD Economies: Is
Convergence Under Way? availableat http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/10/1931460.pdf.
Id.
A. A. BERLE & G. C. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY47 (Harcourt,

Brace and World, 1932).
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active to that of a passive agent"52 There is therefore a "separation of ownership and
control" in which the individual interest of shareholders is made subservient to
that of managers who are in control of a company." The model is referred to as
the "outsider" model because shareholders typically have no interest in
managing the company and retain no relationship with the company except for
their financial investments - the separation of ownership and control is at its
best."
Another key characteristic of the outsider model is that it is a marketbased system (with less reliance on mandatory rules, and greater emphasis on
default rules) that provides a significant role to market players as opposed to
regulators and the State. This regime, which focuses heavily on capital markets,
can be characterized as information-forcing" whereby high disclosure standards
require companies to disclose information and leave decision-making on
investment matters to the various players in the market. It also presupposes the
existence and predominance of proper market systems and sophisticated players
(such as knowledgeable professionals, being lawyers, accountants and
investments bankers, a competent judiciary and other important fiduciaries such
as a cadre of independent directors with a strong foundation in corporate laws
and practices)." The depth of the markets and sophistication of market players
enable a market-oriented approach towards regulation and governance and less
involvement by the State through regulation.
The U.S. and U.K. are classic examples of countries that follow the outsider
model." Looking at their ownership structures, it is found that in these two
countries, "and unlike most of the remaining world, most large corporations are
public and not family-controlled".5 8 In these countries, shareholding is diffused and it
52

Id.

53

BERLE

5

& MEANs, supranote 51.
Id. See also, B. R. Cheffins, Putting Britain on the Roe Map: The Emergence of the BerleMeans Corporationin the United Kingdom in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGMES: CONVERGENCE
AND DIVERSITY

55

56

5

58

151 (Joseph A. Mccahery, Piet Moerland, Theo Raaijmakers & Luc

Renneboog eds., Oxford Univeristy Press, 2002).
Information-forcing rules are default rules that compel parties with superior
information to divulge that information to other parties they deal with so that the
problem of information asymmetry is obviated, or at least reduced. See, Y.Listokin,
Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L. J.480, 501-02 (2008).
See, B. Black & R. Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1912 (1996), B. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditionsfor Strong Securities
Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781 (2001).
Nestor & Thompson, supra note 49, at 5.

B. Black & J. C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?InstitutionalInvestor Behavior Under Limited
Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997, 2001 (1994) [emphasis in original]. See also,
14
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is not common to find companies that have a dominant or controlling
shareholder."
At this juncture, it is appropriate deviate momentarily to examine the
various agency problems that companies face.60 In their seminal work, Kraakman,
et al. identify three types of agency problems:6 1 (i) the conflict between managers
(agent) and owners, being shareholders (principal), (ii) the conflict between
controlling shareholders (agent) and minority shareholders (principal), and (iii)
that between the company itself (agent) and other stakeholders with whom the
company contracts, such as creditors, employees and customers (principal). Due
to the ownership structure embodied in the outsider model, the economies that
follow this model encounter the first agency problem, i.e., the one between
managers and shareholders. The role of corporate law in these jurisdictions is
primarily to address this agency problem. Hence, the principal mechanisms that
corporate law and governance norms employ in those jurisdictions are devised
to address this problem. For example, one strategy used in those jurisdictions is
to populate boards with independent directors so they can act as a check on
managers and thereby protect the interests of the shareholders.6 2 Similarly, the
certification of financial statements and internal controls is an attempt to curb
the increasing powers of senior managers (such as CEO and CFO) to the detriment
of the shareholders. The evolution of such corporate governance concepts is
inextricably linked to this first agency problem as their genesis and rationale
relate back to the need for protection of shareholders against managers.
B. Cheffins, Current Trends in Corporate Governance: Going from London to Milan to
Toronto, 10 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 5, 7 (2000) (Noting that: A common feature in the

United Kingdom and the United States is diffused ownership. In Britain, very few
large companies are controlled by families, and fewer that one-fifth of the country's
publicly quoted firms have an owner who controls more than twenty-five percent

of the shares. Likewise, in the United States, large shareholdings, and especially
59

60

61

62

majority ownership, are uncommon.)
See, Cheffins, supra note 54, at 151. There are indeed exceptions in both the U.S. and
the U.K. The U.S. does have companies that are family-owned, while the U.K. has
companies that are predominantly owned by financial institutions, but that does
not obviate the general character of ownership in these economies wherein shares
are diffusely held.
These agency problems can be examined in the light of the various corporate
actors described earlier. See, supra note 4 and accompanying text. It is to be noted,
however, that the agency concept is used by academics in corporate governance
literature in a wider economic sense and ought to be distinguished from the legal
(contractual) concept of agency. B. Cheffins, The Trajectory of (Corporate Law)
Scholarship 26 (2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-429624.
R KRAAKMAN ETAL., TuEANromYor CIoIATELAw: ACOPARATIVEANDFUNCTIONALAPPROACH
22 (Oxford University Press, 2004).

Id.
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B. The InsiderModel ofCorporateGovernance
The insider model is characterized by cohesive groups of "insiders" who
have a closer and more long-term relationship with the company. 3 This is true
even in the case of companies that are listed on stock exchanges,14 let alone privately
held companies. The insiders (essentially the controlling shareholders) are the
single largest group of shareholders, with the rest of the shareholding being
diffused and held by institutions or individuals constituting the "public"." The
insiders typically tend to have a controlling interest in the company and thereby
possess the ability to exercise dominant control over the company's affairs. As to
the identity of the controlling shareholders, they tend to be mostly business
family groups6 6 or the State.' This is particularly true of Asian countries such as
India and China, which are "markedwith concentratedstock ownership and a preponderance
offamily-controlledbusinesses while State-controlledbusinessesform an importantsegment of
the corporatesector in many of these countries"".It is also otherwise referred to as the
"family/State"model."
In this regime, the minority shareholders do not have much of a say as
they do not hold sufficient number of shares in the company to be in a position to
outvote or even veto the decisions spearheaded by the controlling shareholders.
The dominant shareholders often improve their position in the company by
seeking control and voting rights in excess of the shares they hold. In other words,
their control rights far exceed their economic interests in the company. This is
achieved through cross-holdings, pyramid structures, tunneling and other similar
devices.70 By virtue of their control rights, these dominant shareholders are in a
63

64

66

66

67

Nestor & Thompson, supra note 49, at 9. See also, R. LaPorta et al, Law and Finance,106
J. POL. EcoN. 1113 (1998).
E. Bergl6f & E. von Thadden, The Changing CorporateGovernance Paradigm:Implications

for Transition and Developing Countries 17 (1999), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract-183708.
Here again, as in the case of outsider systems, there could be exceptions whereby
some companies demonstrate diffused shareholding. However, that does not
dilute the general position that companies in the insider systems have concentrated
shareholdings.
There is a preponderance of family-owned businesses in developing countries. J.
Sarkar & S. Sarkar, Large Shareholder Activism in Corporate Governance in Developing
Countries:Evidencefrom India, 1:3 INTERNATIoNAL REVIEW OF FINANCE 161, 168 (2000).
Rampant State ownership in several countries is unsurprising on account of the
fact that privatization is yet to be completed in those countries. See, LaPorta et al,

66
69
7o

CorporateOwnership Around the World, 54 J.FIN. 471, 496 (1999).
Chakrabarti, supra note 16, at 11.
See, Nestor & Thompson, supra note 49, at 12.
LaPorta, supra note 67, at 474. The concepts of pyramid structures and crossholdings are described as follows:
16
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position to exercise complete control over the company. They are virtually able
to appoint and replace the entire board and, through this, influence the
management strategy and operational affairs of the company. For this reason,
the management will likely owe its allegiance to the controlling shareholders.
The controlling shareholders nominate senior members of the management, and
even further, they often appoint themselves on the boards or as managers. It is
not uncommon to find companies that are controlled by family groups to have
senior managerial positions occupied by family members. Similarly, where
companies are controlled by the State, board and senior managerial positions are
occupied by bureaucrats.
Apart from ownership structures, the insider systems display other
characteristics that are unique to them. They possess neither robust capital
markets nor sophisticated market players; if at all; these are in an early stage of
evolution in some countries that have experienced significant capital markets
explosions in the last decade." For this reason, the State continues to perform a
greater role in regulation of corporate activity by imposing mandatory standards
and bright-line rules. There is a perceived reluctance on the part of the State to
rely on market participants or a market-based regulation, perhaps owing to
their lack of sophistication as compared to the outsider systems.
Control in excess of proportional ownership can also be achieved through pyramid
structures or by cross-holdings. In a pyramid structure, one firm owns 51% (for
example) of a second finn, which owns 51% of a third firm, and so on. The owner at
the top of the pyramid thereby has effective control of all the firms in the pyramid,
with an increasingly small investment in each firm down the line. Cross-holdings
exist when a group of companies maintain interlocking ownership positions in
each other. To the extent that the interlocking of their ownership positions makes
group members inclined to support each other, voting coalitions are formed.
D. K. Denis & J. J. McConnell, International Corporate Governance, 23 (European
Corporate Governance Institute Finance, Working Paper No. 05/2003, 2003), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract-320121. Such pyramid structures are utilized by
controlling shareholders to engage in tunnelling, which is the process by which
such shareholders move profits or tunnel them across firms so that the profit
finally resides in firms in which they have high cash flow rights (by virtue of a

greater percentage of shareholding) as opposed to firms in which they have low
cash flow rights. This scheme ensures that controlling shareholders receive a

71

greater share of the profits than the minority shareholders, thereby creating
discrimination among economic rights of shareholders. See, M. Bertrand, P. Mehta
& S. Mullainathan, Ferreting Out Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups,
117(1) QUARTERLY J. ECON. 121, 121 (2002). See also, Chakrabarti,supra note 16, at 7, 12,
LaPorta, supra note 67, at 502.
The BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) are apt examples of economies
that have historically been bereft of developed capital markets, but that have
more recently migrated at a rapid pace to adopt systems and practices from
developed economies so as to ensure robustness of their markets and to attract
not only greater number of investors, but also those with high quality and credibility.
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India is a classic insider system where most public companies are controlled
(by virtue of dominant shareholding) by either business families or the State.72
Business families predominantly own and control companies (even those that
are listed on stock exchanges). This is largely owing to historical reasons whereby
firms were mostly owned by families.' In addition, it is quite common to find
State-owned firms as well.' Several listed companies are also majority-owned
by multinational companies. However, diffused ownership (in the sense of the
Berle and Means (Corporation) can be found only in a handful of Indian listed
companies, where such structures exist more as a matter of exception rather
than as the rule.'
Examining the ownership aspect empirically, we find that even as late as
2002, "the averageshareholdingofpromoters in all Indian companies was as high as 48.1%".76
72

7

7

7

76

For an analysis of India's shareholding structure and controlling shareholder
dominance, see, Chakrabarti,supra note 16. There is one strand of thought that
describes India as a "hybrid of the outside-dominated market-based systems of the U.K.
and the U.S., and the insider-dominatedbank-basedsystems of Germany and Japan". Sarkar
& Sarkar, supra note 66, at 163. However, this observation (contained in a single
study) does not find broader acceptance in the literature pertaining to ownership
structures in India.
Prior to 1991, Indian businesses were subject to tight control and regulation by the
Government. For this reason, all businesses were concentrated in the hands of
rich and influential business families and entities who had the wherewithal to
obtain licenses and approvals from the Government, which were required for
various aspects of running the business, including establishment, operation,
expansion and closure. See, Mohanty, supra note 14, at 235.
There are indeed several listed companies that are government-owned, where
either the Central Government or the government of a State owns the majority
(usually a substantial) ownership interest in the company. Such companies are
also referred to as public sector undertakings (PSUs). See also, Section 617,
Companies Act, 1956.
Even though some companies have undergone metamorphosis from controlled
companies to those with diffused shareholding structures over a period of time,
primarily through repeated offerings of shares to the public to raise capital, it is
expected that this would be a considerably slow process as a general matter.
Further, despite the era of liberalization that was ushered in by the Government in
1991, ownership structures continue to be concentrated for the most part. After
such liberalization, only very few companies have restructured their ownership
so as to make the shareholding pattern truly dispersed in the U.S. sense of the
term. More generally, even where there is a plausible scenario that "public ownership
will become increasinglyprevalent ... controllingshareholders will continue to play a dominant
role" Cheffins, supra note 58, at 35.
Chakrabarti, supra note 16, at 11 [emphasis supplied]. In this context, it must be
noted that the concept of "promoter" has specific legal significance in the Indian
context. The expressions "promoter" and "promoter group" are defined to include (i)
the person or persons who are in overall control of the company, (ii) the person or
persons who are instrumental in the formulation of a plan or program pursuant to
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A more recent study confirms this position, even in the case of listed companies."
That study is based on information available on the websites of the two main
stock exchanges in India, the Bombay Stock Exchange and the National Stock
Exchange,78 and the shareholding pattern of "100 companies constitutingthe BSE 100,
... with a total market capitalizationof nearly$850 billion, and the 500 companies of the BSE
500, which representsnearly93% of the total market capitalizationof the entire Bombay Stock
Exchange".7 The study found that:
[t]he average BSE 100 Company has a promoter who owns over 48% of
the company. Only ten of the BSE 100 companies have promoters holding
stakes below the critical 25% threshold .... Looking at the broader BSE

500 set of companies produces similar results: the average promoter owns
roughly 49%, and fewer than 9% of promoters have stakes below 25%.
This high average concentration of promoter holdings was consistent
with the prediction of practitioners."o
There is more to it than absolute ownership percentages. The power of
concentrated ownership is bolstered by controlling shareholders through other
which securities are offered to the public, and (iii) the person or persons named in
the prospectus as promoters. See, Explanation to clause 6.8.3.2 of the Securities
and Exchange Board of India (Disclosure and Investor Protection) Guidelines,
2000, available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/acts/ipguidelines.pdf. Controlling
shareholders holding a substantial number of shares in the company would be
treated as "promoters" or "promoter group". In that sense, the expressions "controlling

shareholders" and "promoters" are used interchangeably in this Article, because the
former expression is familiar to readers of corporate governance literature in
Western jurisdictions, while the expression "promoters" is familiar in the Indian

context. Such promoters have additional disclosure and other obligations such as
lock-in of shares when an Indian company engages in a public offering of shares.
"

S. J. Mathew, Hostile Takeovers in India: New Prospects, Challenges, and Regulatory
Opportunities,(3) COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 800 (2007).

7

The ownership structure of Indian listed companies can be ascertained through

7

information filed by each of these companies with the stock exchanges. Under
clause 35 of the Listing Agreement all public listed companies are required to file
a statement indicating the shareholding pattern as of the end of each quarter. In
such statement, the shareholding of the promoter and the promoter group are to
be indicated separately.
Mathew, supra note 77, at 832.
Id. Similar conclusions emerge from another recent study of fifty large public
companies on the NSE (the "S&P CNX Nifty"). Geis, supra note 45. As regards
private companies, the ownership concentration among business families is even
more acute. Phani, et al. note that "family firms orfamily owned firms in India constitute
99.9 percent of all privateIndian companies" and that the "control of thesefamily enterprises

8o

usually vests with a small group of shareholders, often belonging to the same family, with
investments as low as 10% in the firm's assets .. B.V. Phani et al, Insider Ownership,
Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance4 (2005), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract-696462.
19

Vol. 21 (1)

NationalLaw School ofIndia Review

2009

mechanisms such as cross-holdings, pyramid structures and tunneling." These
phenomena "mark the Indiancorporatelandscape".' They often lead to greater benefits
to the controlling shareholders at the cost of the minority shareholders." Such
practices can also have an adverse effect on the development of capital markets
as minority shareholders are considerably exposed to the actions of controlling
shareholders. This is because controlling shareholders are in a position to shape
the composition of the board of directors. All directors owe their allegiance to the
controlling shareholders as their appointment," renewal and continuance in office
(without removal)a are subject to the wishes of the controlling shareholders."
Managers who are not on the board also owe their allegiance to controlling
shareholders as the board of directors that appoints managers are within the control
of such shareholders. All these are evidence of ownership concentration in Indian
listed companies, with significant powers to the controlling shareholders.
8

82

83

8

For an introdciatory discussion of these concepts, see, LaPorta, supra note 70 and
accompanying text.
Chakrabarti, supra note 16, at 1. See also, Bertrand, Mehta & Mullainathan, supra
note 70, at 126, observing the concept of cross-holdings in Indian family business

groups: "As in many other countries, groupfirms in India are often linked together through
the ownership of equity shares.In most cases, the controlling shareholderis afamily; among
the best-known businessfamilies in India are Tata, Baja], Birla, Oberoi, and Mahindra"
Chakrabarti, supra note 16, at 12, noting that:
Recent research has also investigated the nature and extent of "tunneling" of
funds within business groups in India. During the 90's Indian business groups
evidently tunneled considerable amount of funds up the ownership pyramid
thereby depriving the minority shareholders of companies at lower levels of
the pyramids of their rightful gains.
In India, the appointment of each director is to be voted on individually at a
shareholders' meeting by way of a separate resolution. Each director's appointment
is to be approved by a majority of shareholders present and voting on such resolution.
Hence, controlling shareholders, by virtue of being able to muster a majority of
shareholders present and voting on such resolution can control the appointment of
every single director on the board. See, section 263, Companies Act, 1956. The position
of the controlling shareholders further gets reinforced due to the dispersed nature
of the remaining shareholding in the company. In most Indian companies, institutional
shareholders do not individually hold a significant percentage shareholding, even

85

86

though the aggregate shareholding of all institutional shareholders may be fairly
substantial. Further, although establishment of coalitions of institutional shareholders
is generally not subject to restrictions under law (unlike in the U.S.), institutional
shareholders in practice rarely form coalitions except in dire circumstances, such as
where the company is on the verge of bankruptcy or the promoters or managers of
the company have been involved in egregious conduct. This factor adds to the vast
powers already available to controlling shareholders in determining the board
composition of an Indian company.
Any director may be removed before the end of her term without cause by a
majority of shareholders present and voting on such resolution. See, Section 284 of
the Companies Act, 1956.
This rule applies equally to the appointment and tenure of independent directors
that are likewise subject to a majority vote of the shareholders, and hence subject
to concurrence of the controlling shareholders.
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Returning to the Kraakman, et al. paradigm," we find that insider systems
encounter the second agency problem, i.e., the one between controlling
shareholders and minority shareholders. The primary role of corporate law in
these jurisdictions is to address this agency problem." Minority shareholders
are the constituency that requires the law's protection." The controlling
shareholders are well-placed due to their control and dominance over the
company to protect their own interests which are aligned with that of the
company and the managers. Therefore, the first agency problem in the Kraakman
et al. paradigm, i.e., the one between the managers and shareholders, does not
exist at all in insider systems. The role of the law is to curtail the powers and
actions of the controlling shareholders and to provide remedies to the minority
shareholders.
Examining the issue on a broader plane, there are a number of mechanisms
that could potentially be employed under the insider model to address the agency
problems between the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders,
although I confine myself here to the discussion of a few. First,minority shareholders
can be conferred meaningful participation in crucial decisions pertaining to the
company, such as determining the composition of the board of directors. The
appointment of directors can be determined through proportional representation,
such that minority shareholders are able to elect such number directors on the
board correlative to the percentage of their shareholding in the company."
However, the system of proportional representation for appointment of directors,
although available under Indian company law, is only optional." On the contrary,
8

"
8

9

See, R. KRAAKMAN, supranote 61 and accompanying text.
See, A. Shleifer & R. Vishny, A Survey of CorporateGovernance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997).
Minority shareholders rarely have the benefit of board representation. For a
description of how the board can tackle the agency problems between controlling
shareholders and minority shareholders, see, P. L. Davies, The Board of Directors:
Composition, Structure, Duties and Powers, (Paper on Company Law Reform in OECD
Countries: A Comparative Outlook of Current Trends, 2000), available at http://

www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/30/1857291.pdf.
The proportional representation may be by a single transferable vote or by a
system of cumulative voting. As Professor Gordon describes:
Cumulative voting operates in two distinct settings. First, a single shareholder

(or cohesive group) owning a significant minority block can automatically
elect a director to the board. But second, cumulative voting lowers the cost of

mobilizing diffuse shareholders because electoral success-in the sense of
placing a nominee on the board- requires much less than 50% of the votes.
For example, for a ten-person board elected annually, a dissident need to rally
only a 10% shareholder vote to put a director on the board. So cumulative
voting offers significant potential for shareholder selection of at least some
directors who would be independent in this genealogical sense.
Gordon, supra note 5, at 1498.
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the current system of board appointments confers paramount powers on the
controlling shareholders to determine the composition of the board to the
substantial exclusion of minority shareholders. 92 Second, the controlling
shareholders may be foisted with duties, such as fiduciary duties, owed to the
company or to the minority shareholders, such that they are compelled to take
into account the interests of that constituency." However, under Indian law,
shareholders do not owe fiduciary duties either to the company or to the minority
shareholders as a matter of general principle.94 Third, there are minority protection
rights and remedies such as for oppression and mismanagement available in
several Commonwealth countries. 95 In India, minority shareholders may
approach the Company Law Board pursuant to sections 397 and 398,
Companies Act, 1956 to seek appropriate relief against oppression and
mismanagement by the controlling shareholders. However, minority
91

Section 265, Companies Act, 1956. It is hardly surprising then that very few
companies, if any at all, have adopted the system of proportional representation
to elect their directors.

92

For a detailed discussion on the matter, including the mechanics of director

appointment, see, supra note 84 and accompanying text. As one observer notes: "In

9

a cumulative voting system, minority shareholdersmay gain proportional representationon
the board of directors if they accumulate votes, whereas in a majority voting system, even a
minority with 49.9% of the stock may be completely shut out of board representation". D. J.
Hartnett, Greenmail:Can the Abuses Be Stopped? 80 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1271, 1285 (1986).
Even outsider systems, the U.S. (under Delaware law) being the prime example,
impose fiduciary duties on controlling shareholders. See, KRAAKMAN ET AL., Supra
note 61, 126-27 (noting that "U.S. courts attempt to control the abuse of minority
shareholdersby submittingcontrollingshareholders ... to a particularlyhigh level offiduciary
duty - a duty of 'utmost good faith and loyalty' - toward the company and its minority
shareholders"). See also, Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems Inc., 638 A. 2d 1110
(Del. 1994), Kahn v. Tremont, 694 A. 2d 422 (Del. 1997). This fiduciary duty is applied
specifically in cases involving self-dealing transactions by the controlling

shareholders.
94

95

See, Rolta India Ltd. v. Venire Industries Ltd., [2000] 100 Comp. Cas. 19 (Bom)
[Bombay High Court]. However, fiduciary duties do operate at the board level as
they attach to directors. Hence, where controlling shareholders nominate directors
on boards of companies, such directors are bound by fiduciary duties in their
capacity as directors. Id. To that extent, the fiduciary duties that apply to controlling
shareholders' nominees as directors may likely act as an indirect constraint against
certain actions such as self-dealing, although in the absence of any direct duties
on controlling shareholders, the efficacy of these indirect checks and balances on
controlling shareholder excesses is in grave doubt.
These rights and remedies enable minority shareholders to approach a court of
law or other appropriate authority to seek protection against acts of oppression
and mismanagement by controlling shareholders. The court or authority usually
possesses wide-ranging powers to grant reliefs to the minority shareholders, and
these include requiring the controlling shareholder to purchase the shares of the
minority shareholders at fair value, superseding the board of the company and
even forcing a restructuring of the company.
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shareholders are required to satisfy certain prerequisites from a substantive point
of view before they can espouse their cause.96 Furthermore, there are procedural
hurdles as well: the remedies before the Company Law Board can be sought only
by shareholders satisfying a minimum threshold.7 Based on this analysis, we
find that the existing system of minority shareholder protection (particularly
under Indian law) is inadequate,9 8 and hence corporate governance reforms in
insider models generally, and India in particular, need to place greater emphasis
on this issue.
However, as we have seen in Part IL the current focus of the law has been
on various requirements of corporate governance such as independent directors,
audit committee and CEO/CFO certification that originated in the context of the
outsider model and have been replicated in the insider model in the case of India.
Adequate attention has not been paid in existing literature to the efficacy of this
approach when the concepts that were devised for one model are sought to be fit
into another model from a corporate governance standpoint. This represents a
perceptible gap in the theoretical underpinnings of Indian corporate governance,
and hence requires careful reconsideration, as I detail in the next Part.
96

The high bar imposed on minority shareholders in initiating such action is evident
from the law laid down by the Supreme Court of India:
It is not enough to show that there is just and equitable cause for winding up
the company though that must be shown as a preliminary to the application of
section 397. It must further be shown that the conduct of the majority
shareholders was oppressive to the minority as members and this requires
that events have to be considered not in isolation but as part of a consecutive
story. There must be continuous acts on the part of the majority shareholders,
continuing up to the date of petition, showing that the affairs of the company
were being conducted in a manner oppressive to some part of the members.
The conduct must be burdensome, harsh and wrongful, and mere lack of
confidence between the majority shareholders and the minority shareholders
would not be enough unless the lack of confidence springs from oppression of
a minority by a majority in the management of the company's affairs and such

oppression must involve at least an element of lack of probity or fair dealing
to a member in the matter of his proprietary rights as a shareholder.
97

98

Shanti Prasad Jain v. Kalinga Tubes Ltd., [1965] 35 Comp. Cas. 351, 366 [S.C.].
The support required for filing a petition against oppression and mismanagement
is 100 shareholders or shareholders holding 10% of shares, whichever is less.
Section 399, Companies Act, 1956.

Apart from the inadequacy of minority protection under law, or presumably for
that reason itself, there is a lack of a vibrant culture or practice of investor activism
that could propel companies and their boards and controlling shareholders towards
enhanced corporate governance. For n discussion on this point, see, Geis, supra
note 45.
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OF LEGAL TRANSPLANTS IN INDIAN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE

In this Part, I identify certain principles behind the phenomenon of legal
transplants, and examine their impact in the context of the Indian corporate
governance regime.
A. Legal Transplants: The Concept
A legal transplant involves the adoption by one country of laws or legal

concepts from another country. This could "rangefrom the wholesale adoption ofentire
systems of law to the copying of a single rule".9 9 Transplants have become common in
the area of corporate governance, primarily due to globalization and the
exportation of capital markets to various jurisdictions. 0 0
There are several benefits of legal transplants. They are not only useful in
setting common standards for legal rights and obligations across jurisdictions,
but are also less costly and quick to implement. 01 On the other hand, transplants
come with several disadvantages. Mere importation of a legal rule without proper
adaptation to local conditions is likely to result in failure. This is on account of the
fact that several social, political and economic factors that are present in the
country of origin may not be present in the country of import, or may be present
with substantial variations, all of which make the importation a fairly complex
exercise."102 Unless these factors are taken into account, there will be a lack of
H. Kanda & C. Milhaupt, Re-examining Legal Transplants: The Director'sFiduciaryDuty
in Japanese CorporateLaw, 51 Am. J. CoMw. L. 887, 887 (2003).
100 Transplants have become a way of signaling to investors that a country intends to
comply with the investors' domestic legal standards. See, D. Berkowitz et al, The
Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L 163, 164 (2003).
101 Kanda & Milhaupt, supra note 99, at 889.
102
See, Berkowitz, supra note 100, at 167-68 observing as follows:
We develop a definition of the "transplant effect" as a proxy for the process of
legal transplantation and reception. ... Our basic argument is that for law to be
effective, a demand for law must exist so that the law on the books will actually
be used in practice and legal intermediaries responsible for developing the law
are responsive to the demand. If the transplant adapted the law to local
conditions, or had a population that was already familiar with basic legal principles
of the transplanted law, then we would expect that the law would be used. ...
However, if the law was not adapted to local conditions, or if it was imposed via
colonization and the population within the transplant was not familiar with the
law, then we would expect that initial demand for using these laws to be weak.
Legal intermediaries would have a more difficult time developing the law to
match the demand. Countries that receive the law in this fashion are thus subject
to the "transplant effect-"; their legal order would function less effectively than
origins or transplants that either adapted the law to local conditions and/or had
a population that was familiar with the transplanted law.
9
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motivation on the part of market players as well as regulators to implement the
rule.10 3 In other words, if the transplanted rule is unlikely to find a "fit"within the
recipient legal system, the transplantation is bound to result in failure, as the
rule may never be implemented.'" Implementation failures may occur on two
counts. First, the rule may never be implemented at all. Second, the rule may be
implemented in a formal sense, but not substantively thereby defeating the
purpose of the transplant.
The importation of several corporate governance concepts into an emerging
economy like India from the developed economies like the U.S. and U.K. is a classic
instance of legal transplant. However, the efficacy of the transplant is open for
debate.'05 Any problems with regard to transplantation of these corporate
governance concepts are exacerbated by the differing political, social and economic
considerations that operate in these two sets of jurisdictions, namely the U.S. and
U.K. (the outsider system) on the one hand, and India (an insider system) on the
other. 06 It is the conceit of this Article that several of these corporate governance
los

104

10s

106

See, GORDON & ROE, supra note 41, at 6 (observing that "[t]ransplanting some of the
formal elements without regardfor the institutionalcomplements may lead to serious problems
later, and these problems may impede, or reverse, convergence").
Kanda and Milhaupt examine legal transplants through their study of the
exportation of a single rule of corporate law, the director's duty of loyalty from the
U.S. to Japan, and find that the rule was dormant for nearly forty years after its
importation into Japan. Kanda & Milhaupt, supra note 99, at 889. See also, T. Paredes,
A Systems Approach to CorporateGovernance Reform: Why Importing U.S. CorporateLaw
Isn't the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1055, 1058 (2004) (arguing that a "danger of
transplantingU.S. corporatelaw to developing economies is that it might not fit with the
"importing" country's economic structure,political system, social order,or culturalvalues").
Banaji and Mody study the Anglo-American approach to corporate governance in
the context of the Cadbury Committee Report and observe:
[O]ne should note that Cadbury makes several assumptions. It assumes a
corporate culture or system where there is already a widespread and wellestablished separation of ownership and control. Cadbury is not tailor-made to
a context where dominant shareholders, e.g. promoters, control management
where the corporate governance problem is chiefly one of the protection of
minority shareholder rights. ... Cadbury's assumption is dispersed ownership,
and SEBI's overdependence on Cadbury seems to have carried over some of
the consequences of that assumption into a market where concentrated
ownership is the chief source of the problem.
J. Banaji & G. Mody, Corporate Governance and the Indian Private Sector, (University of
Oxford, Queen Elizabeth House, Working Paper Number 73, 2001) [emphasis in
original], available at http://www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/qehwp/qehwps73.pdf.
See, Paredes, supra note 104, at 1059 dealing in general with the employability of
U.S. corporate governance in other parts of the world. He observes:
The bottom line for most developing countries is that importing a corporate law
regime along the line of the U.S. model, or otherwise depending on a marketbased model of governance, is not a viable option. More to the point, importing
U.S. corporate law falls far short of replicating the U.S. system of corporate
governance in developing countries leaving many of the important parts behind.
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concepts are not yet implemented effectively in India, and this implementation
10
failure raises questions regarding the viability of the transplant itself. 7
At this stage, it may be useful to support this proposition by means of an
illustration, one that deals with the concept of independent directors. As we have
seen, controlling shareholders in Indian companies possess significant voting
power, both de jure and defacto, and can determine the composition of the boards
of most Indian public listed companies by exercising their voting power to appoint
or remove directors. 08 This holds good for the appointment of independent
directors as well. Hence, although independent directors (a seemingly critical
component of the corporate governance norms) are required to act in the general
interests of the company and the shareholder body as a whole, in practice they
are generally likely to owe their defacto allegiance to the controlling shareholders,
as such directors depend on the controlling shareholders for their board seats (as
well as remuneration and other terms and conditions). In view of this, independent
directors may have a tendency to passively approve actions taken by controlling
shareholders and the managers (whose appointments again are subject to be
influenced substantially by the controlling shareholders). Proceeding on the
assumption that one of the fundamental purposes of corporate governance in
India is to address the agency problem between two sets of shareholders by
protecting the interests of the minority shareholders from actions of the controlling
shareholders, this purpose is defeated at its very source because the
instrumentality of independent directors that has been created to solve this
agency problem is itself subject to potential dominance by the controlling
shareholders.'0 9 The only argument that may nevertheless work in favour of
independent directors is the fact that controlling shareholders would not risk the
reputation of either themselves or the public listed company by hiring and firing
independent directors at will since that would have its impact on market
107

100
109

It is, of course, arguable that ten years presents too short a timeframe to assess

the viability of a new piece of legislation. See, Berkowitz, supra note 100, at 165
(noting that "[ilt obviously takes time for the law to gain more than a book-life and to
influence household andfirm-level decision making,for lawyers to be trainedin the new rules
and for cases to be brought to court for clarificationand interpretation"). However, such
a timeframe will likely provide preliminary evidence of the acceptability of the
legislation, and any early assessment of its viability will help regulators mould
their implementation strategy in a timely fashion.
Supra notes 84 and 85 and accompanying text.
As controlling shareholders have vast powers to determine the selection of the
independent directors, it is likely that controlling shareholders would most likely
appoint persons who would be passive to their decision-making. Further, even
independent directors who may wish to act in the larger interests of the company
may be precluded from doing so because of the wide-ranging powers that
controlling shareholders exercise.
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reputation and in turn its ability to attract high quality investors and also
command a good market value for its shares. However, reputational incentives
alone may not be a fully reassuring solution to the problem if there is no legal
support for enhancing the powers of the independent directors so as to keep them
outside the influence of controlling shareholders.
In the U.S. this problem has been partially addressed by requiring each
company to have a nomination committee consisting of independent directors
who choose or recommend names of persons for appointment as independent
directors." 0 However, in India, Clause 49 does not make it mandatory for a
company to have a nomination committee consisting of independent directors.
The independent directors are appointed by the shareholders and hence the
amount of control that a shareholder possesses would determine its influence in
the decision-making process. Due to incongruence in the appointment process,
the Indian system presents considerable obstacles to the appointment of truly
independent directors. That would be the case unless the right to make the choice
of independent directors is taken out of the hands of the controlling shareholders.11
The incongruence in the position of independent directors does not end
there. One specific fact demonstrates that the concept of independent directors
has been transplanted from the outsider system to an insider system such as
India without regard having been placed on the differences in corporate structures.
In the U.S., both the New York Stock Exchange [hereinafter "NYSE"] as well as the
110 New York Stock Exchange, Listed Company Manual § 303A.04 (2003) [hereinafter
"NYSE Listed Company Manual"], available at http://www.nyse.com/lcm/

1cm section.html; NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, Rule 4350(c)(4) (2003) [hereinafter
the "NASDAQ Rules"], available at http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/nasdaqtools/
platformviewer.asp?selectednode=chp%5fl%5fl%5f4%5fl&manual=%2fnasdaq%
2fmain%2fnasdaq%2dequityrules%2f. The requirement of a nomination committee
consisting of independent directors ensures that the appointment of independent
directors is kept outside the influence of the controlling shareholders or managers.
111 There are some alternative possibilities for a more inclusive process of

appointment of independent directors. First among them is voting through
proportional representation, such that minority shareholders have a say in the
appointment of some independent directors. For a discussion of proportional
representation, see, supra note 90 and accompanying text. I lowever, since
proportional representation is not mandatory under Indian law, companies are
not obligated to follow that method. The second method is the appointment of
certain independent directors by a "majority of the minority" with such independent
directors being elected by a vote of only the minority shareholders, where the

controlling shareholders are required to abstain from participating in the voting
process. Even this is not required under Indian law, although again there is a
facility for appointment of a director by small shareholders (i.e., those who hold
shares of a nominal value of Rs. 20,000 or less), but even that is optional. See,
section 252(1), Companies Act, 1956.
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NASDAQ do not require a board to have a majority of independent directors
when the company is a "controlledcompany", i.e., one where a single person, group
or company controls more than 50% of the voting power.112 The rationale for the
exception appears to be that where there is a controlling shareholder, the other
shareholders may not be afforded sufficient protection by independent directors.
Furthermore, this is explicit recognition of the fact that independent directors are
a solution to the agency problem between managers and shareholders and, by
inference, not to agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority
shareholders." 3
This illustration of the independent director concept is replete with
problems that are likely to be encountered when concepts from outsider systems
are transplanted to insider systems without adequate consideration of inherent
differences in corporate structures or other relevant factors.

B. Impact of Transplantson Indian CorporateGovernanceReforms
At a more general level, there exists some evidence, both empirical and
anecdotal, about the impact of these corporate governance reforms on Indian
businesses, which indicates mixed results.
1. Recent Empirical Evidence
There is an emerging body of empirical literature on Indian corporate
governance,' 14 but for the present purposes it would suffice to review two recent
empirical studies. In the first, 1" an event study,"6 Black and Khanna study the
impact of corporate governance reforms reflected by the formation of the Kumar
112
See, NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 110, § 303A.00; NASDAQ Rules,
supra note 110, R. 4350(c)(5). This is a less-known detail in the context of Indian
corporate governance. As a noted Indian industrialist bemoans: "I find the lack of

mention of thisfact in the outpouringof verbiage on this issue in our country quite amazing"
Rahul Bajaj, How Independent Can a DirectorBe?, REDIFF, Jul. 30, 2005.
11

There is some academic support for this argument:
[NYSE and NASDAQ] see independent directors as a protection for
shareholders specifically against management, not against other shareholders.
A shareholder who controls a company does not need an external rulemaker
to protect him from a management team that he has the power to appoint.
Minority shareholders may need protection from controlling shareholders,

but the exchanges are apparently willing to leave this task to other bodies of

law, such as federal securities law requiring disclosures, and state corporate
law mandating certain fiduciary duties.

D. C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the Independent Director,32 DEL. J.CORP. L. 73, 94 (2007)
114

11
116

[emphasis in original].
For a review of this empirical literature, see, Chakrabarti, Megginson & Yadav,
supra note 17, at 70-71.
Black & Khanna, supra note 21.
An event study involves identifying the release of specific information about a
company followed by an examination of the performance of the stock of the
28
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Mangalam Birla Committee 1 and find that over a 2-day event window around
May 7, 1999," the share prices of large firms, to which the corporate governance
reforms were then intended to apply, rose by roughly 4% relative to other small
firms, thereby signaling the investors' expectations that corporate governance
reforms will increase market value of firms. 9 The second study by Dharmapala
and Khanna acknowledges the importance of enforcement in corporate
governance reform.12 0 The authors study the impact of the introduction of section
23E, Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 in 2004 that imposed large
penalties of Rs. 25 crores (Rs. 250 million) for non-compliance with the Listing
Agreement (that also includes Clause 49 containing the corporate governance
norms).1 2 1 Using a sample of over 4000 firms during the 1998-2006 period, the

study reveals a "large and statisticallysignificantpositive effect (amounting to over 10% of
firm value) of the Clause 49 reforms in combinationwith the 2004 sanctions" 122
While these studies indicate a positive impact of corporate governance
reforms in the market place, and are extremely useful in setting the agenda for
further empirical debate in the Indian context, they are to be treated with some
caution. 123 As for the first study by Black and Khanna, it is arguable that the date
chosen for the event study, i.e., May 7, 1999, is premature, and that the information
company. If the information is important enough, the stock price will fluctuate
upwards or downwards depending on the acceptability of that information to
investors. See, R. J. GILSON & B.. BLACK, THE LAw & FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQuIsmoNs 185
(West Publishing Company, 1995). This is a useful tool to determine whether the
market accepts the information as positive (where the stock price can be expected
to rise) or negative (when the stock price can be expected to drop).
"
See, Black & Khanna, supra note 21.
118 The authors selected May 7, 1999 as the core event date for the study as that is the
date on which the Government announced the formation of the Kumar Mangalam
Birla Committee to suggest corporate governance reforms. The authors also rely
on the fact that that "investors had reason to expect the [Kumar Mangalam Birla
Committee] proposals to be similar to the CII Code". See, Black & Khanna, supra note 21,
at 6.
119

Id.

120

Dharmapala & Khanna, supra note 41.
Dharmapala & Khanna, supra note 41, at 9.
Dharmapala & Khanna, supra note 41, at 3.
It is a different matter, somewhat related though, that event studies generally are
said to be accompanied by some innate limitations. For example, where there is
gradual release of information, there could be some doubt as to when the information
was in fact released to the market. There are also multiple explanations to events,
and [a]n event study can tell us that something happened but it can't tell us why. ...
The event study technique does not eliminate the need to assess cause through
deductive reasoning. Sometimes, there will be two or more plausible explanations
for why a firm's stock price changes in response to new information.
See, GrtsON & BLACK, supra note 116, at 215.

121
122
123
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about the details of the corporate governance reforms cannot be said to have
filtered through the corporate system so as to affect the stock price.124 While the
study can be said to confirm the desire and expectation of Indian firms to submit
themselves to greater measures of corporate governance, the difficulty arises on
account of the fact that the precise details of the reforms (including whether the
measures will be imported to some extent from other jurisdictions) cannot have
been factored in at such an early stage and hence this study does not affirm
acceptability (or otherwise) of the specific concepts of corporate governance that
were to be incorporated (which were subsequently introduced only after the
Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee issued its recommendations). Acceptability
of enhanced corporate governance measures is one thing; assimilation of the
25
detailed norms is yet another.1
The second study by Dharmapala and Khanna also poses some challenges.
It shows a positive correlation between the introduction of stringent enforcement
norms and companies' market value. But, in the Indian context, law (or even strong
penalties) on the statute books do not result in effective enforcement. Regard is also
to be had to the inadequate enforcement machinery and the overburdened court
system that make enforcement cumbersome in practice. There is ample discussion
in existing literature about these problems that plague law enforcement in India.126
Hence, the evidence pertaining to the success of implementation of corporate
governance reforms lies in whether violations have been successfully prosecuted in
fact, and not whether there are stringent penal provisions in the law. An assessment
based on the enforcement provisions on the statute books would be inadequate.12

124

125
126

All that was known to the market on that date is the formation of a committee
under the chairmanship of Mr. Kumar Mangalam Birla to enhance corporate
governance. There was no indication as to the possible outcome of the committee's
deliberations, except perhaps some general expectation that it would further the
reforms that began voluntarily by the CII Code. No details with any level of
adequacy was available at that stage, thereby questioning whether the stock
price movement that such an early stage is any indication at all about the
acceptability of the reform measures in corporate governance.
The event study answers the former, but does not entirely address the latter.
As some academics note that "when it comes to enforcement ... the de facto protection

of investor's rights in India lags significantly behind the de jure protection". Chakrabarti,
Megginson & Yadav, supra note 17, at 67. This is essentially on account of an

overburdened Indian judicial system. In the Doing Business Report 2009 published
by the World Bank, India ranks 122 out of a total of 181 countries surveyed in
relation to the ease of doing business. As regards enforcement of contracts, India
127

is second from the bottom (after only Timor-Leste). See, World Bank Doing Business
Report 2009, available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/documents DBO9_Overview.pdf.
In a broad sense, the threat of enforcement may itself act as a deterrent against
non-compliance. But, that may be the case in jurisdictions where the enforcement
30
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2. Recent Anecdotal Evidence
The anecdotal evidence on the success of implementation of corporate
governance reforms is not as optimistic as that of its empirical variety. While the
general trend has been for companies to comply (at least in form) with the
requirements of Clause 49, there have been significant obstacles to the
implementation of these norms and to their acceptability within the Indian
corporate ecosystem. To begin with, there was considerable resistance to the
stringent corporate governance norms even prior to their enactment in a detailed
form. For instance, although detailed revisions to Clause 49 (such as strengthening
the definition of "independence" of directors) were introduced in 2004, it was met
with cold reception from Indian industry, due to which the implementation of
the revisions had to be postponed several times until they were finally mandated
to take effect from January 1, 2006.128
Even thereafter, the enforcement of Clause 49 by SEBI has been without
tremendous success. Curiously enough, government companies are found to be
the gravest violators of Clause 49. In a string of cases, SEBI initiated action in
2007129 against several government companies for non-compliance with Clause
49.30 However, these actions were subsequently dropped by SEBI."3 This episode

128

129

130

can be successfully taken to its logical end, and not in jurisdictions such as India
where the success of enforcement actions is ridden with uncertainty due to the
inadequacy of the enforcement machinery. More generally, it has been observed
empirically that "in securities law, we find that several aspects of public enforcement, such
as having an independent and/orfocused regulatoror criminal sanctions, do not matter ....
Rafael La Porta et al, What Works in Securities Laws? 22 (Tuck School of Business at
Dartmouth, Working Paper No. 03-22, 2003).
See, supra note 26. See also, R. Mishra & K.R. Srivats, Revised Clause 49 of Listing
Agreement-Murthy Panel may Redefine 'Independent Director' to Allay Fears, THE HINDU
BUSINEss LINE, Feb. 18,2004; SEBIDefers Implementation of Clause 49, THE HINDU BusINESS
LINE, Mar. 24, 2005.
SEBI Cracks the Whip -Violation of CorporateCode Under Lens, THE TELEGRAPH, Sept. 12,
2007; SEBI Proceeds Against 20 Cos For Not Complying With Clause 49 Norms, THE HINDU
BUSINEss LINE, Sept. 12, 2007.
SEBI repeatedly made public statements through its Chairman indicating its
intention to ensure that government companies too strictly comply with Clause
49. See, PSUs Must Meet Clause 49 Norms, REDIFF MONEY, Jan. 3, 2008. These actions

were initiated on the specific count that these government companies had failed
to appoint the requisite number of independent directors as required by Clause
49.
ia1

During October and November 2008, SEBI passed a series of orders involving
several government companies, viz. NTPC Limited (Oct. 8), GAIL (India) Limited
(Oct. 27), Indian Oil Corporation Limited (Oct. 31) and Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation Limited (Nov. 3), all availableat www.sebi.gov.in. The principal ground
for dropping the action is that in the case of the government companies involved
the articles of association provides for the appointment of directors by the

President of India (as the controlling shareholder), acting through the relevant
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may likely have deleterious consequences on corporate governance reforms in
India. Compliance or otherwise of corporate governance norms by government
companies has an important signaling effect. Strict adherence to these norms by
government companies may persuade others to follow as well. But, when
government companies violate the norms with impunity, it is bound to trigger
negative consequences in the market-place thereby making implementation of
corporate governance norms a more arduous task.
Even among non-government companies, there have been inadequacies in
strict compliance with the basic requirements of corporate governance set forth
in Clause 49. For instance, over a thousand companies have yet to file their
corporate governance compliance reports for the quarter ended September 30,
2008.132 Although this is a blatant violation of the listing agreement, there is no
evidence of stringent action having been taken by SEBI or the stock exchanges
against such companies. Such implementation failures raise important questions
as to the acceptability of transplanted concepts of corporate governance in the
Indian context.
3. Lessons from Satyam
The most recent, and significant, piece of anecdotal evidence regarding the
lack of full-fledged implementation of Indian corporate governance norms presents
itself in the form of accounting irregularities that emerged in Satyam Computer
Services Limited, a leading information technology services company in India.
On January 7, 2009, the Chairman of the company, Mr. Ramalinga Raju, who
(along with his family) around that period owned about 5% shares in the company,
confessed to having falsified the financial statements of the company, including
by showing fictitious cash assets of over US$ 1 billion on its books.' The stock
administrative Ministry. SEBI found that despite continuous follow up by the
government companies, the appointments did not take effect due to the need to
follow the requisite process and hence the failure by those companies to comply
with Clause 49 was not deliberate or intentional.
132

133

V Dhoot et al, Over 1,300 Firms Fail to File Corporate Governance Reports,

FINANCIAL

EXPRESS, Jan. 31, 2009.
In his confession addressed to Satyam's board, Raju wrote:
It is with deep regret, and tremendous burden that I am carrying on my
conscience, that I would like to bring the following factors to your notice::

1. The Balance Sheet carries as of September 30, 2008
a. Inflated (non-existent) cash and bank balances of Rs. [50.40 billion] (as
against [Rs. 53.61 billion] reflected in the books)
b. An accrued interest of [Rs. 3.76 billion] which is non-existent
c. An understated liability of [Rs. 12.30 billion] on account of funds arranged
by me
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price of the company reacted adversely to this information and fell more than
70%,134 thereby wiping out the wealth of its shareholders, some of whom are
employees with stock options." This episode invoked fervent reaction from the
government. Several regulatory authorities such as the Ministry of Company
Affairs, Government of India 6 and SEBI...initiated investigations into the matter.
While several independent directors of the company resigned with the disclosure
of the financial irregularities,"' the remaining directors were substituted with
persons nominated by the Government.13 9 Certain key officers of Satyam, being
the chairman, the managing director and the chief financial officer were arrested
by the police within a few days following the confession,'4 0 while two partners
of PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Satyam's auditor, were arrested thereafter. 4' The
investigations by the various authorities, which are likely to be time-consuming,
are ongoing and it is expected that their outcome will be available only in due
course. At a broader level, the Satyam episode has triggered renewed calls for
d. An over stated debtors position of [Rs. 4.90 billion] (as against [Rs. 26.51
billion] reflected in the books
2. For the September quarter (Q2) we reported a revenue of [Rs. 27 billion]
and an operating margin of [Rs. 6.49 billion] (24% of revenues) as against
the actual revenues of [Rs. 21.12 billion] and an actual operating margin of
[Rs. 610 million] (3% of revenues). This has resulted in artificial cash and
bank balances going up by [Rs. 5.88 billion] in Q2 alone.

The gap in the Balance Sheet has arisen purely on account of inflated profits over
a period of last several years ... What started as a marginal gap between actual
operating profit and the one reflected in the books of accounts continued to grow
over the years. It has attained unmanageable proportions as the size of the
company operations grew significantly.
Letter dated Jan. 7, 2009 from B. Ramalinga Raju, Chairman, Satyam Computer
Services Ltd. to the Board of Directors, Satyam Computer Services Ltd. [hereinafter
the "Chairman's Confession"], available at http://blogs.livemint.com/blogs/
initial-private-opinion/SatyamConf.pdf.
134
Satyam Chief Admits Huge Fraud,THE NEW YORK TIMEs, Jan. 8, 2009.
135 S. Mishra & R. Shinde, Satyam Esop-Holders in Deep Sea as Valuation Takes a Hit, THE
EcoNomic TIMES, Jan. 8, 2009.

S. Sanyal, Government Refers Satyam Case to Serious Frauds Investigation Office, THE
EcoNoMIc TIMES, Jan. 13, 2009.
137 0. A. Ninan, Satyam Episode: SEBI Enquiries Will Focus on Three Areas, THE HINDU
BUSINESS LINE, Jan. 16, 2009.
138
Two More Directors Resign from Satyam, THE FINANCIAL EXPREss, Dec. 29, 2008.
139
M. Jagota & R. Guha, India Names New Satyam Board, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL ASIA,
Jan. 12, 2009.
140
Satyam's Raju Brothers Arrested by AP Police, THE EcoNoMIc TIMEs, Jan. 9, 2009; Satyam
Fraud:Raju Sent to Central Prison;CFO VadlamaniArrested, THE EcoNoMIc TIMEs, Jan. 10,
2009.
141 J. Range, PricewaterhousePartners Arrested in Satyam Probe, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
136

AsIA, Jan. 25, 2009.
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corporate governance reforms in India, and it is likely that changes may be
proposed to corporate governance norms in the light of lessons learnt from the
Satyam episode.14
In the meanwhile, it is necessary to examine how such misstatements were
made possible despite the applicability not only of Clause 49 (as Satyam was
listed on Indian stock exchanges), but also of SOX (as the company was also listed
on the NYSE). Satyam had seemingly complied with all the onerous requirements
imposed by Clause 49 and SOX, such as the appointment of an impressive array
of independent directors, an audit committee, and the audit of its financial
statements by a "Big Four" audit firm, but these corporate governance failures
nevertheless occurred.14 3 This episode raises serious questions about
implementation of corporate governance norms in India, and points towards a
failure of transplantation.
142

Some of the immediate developments towards change can be summarized as
follows: (i) within days of the Satyam episode coming to light, the CII set up a
special task force on corporate governance to examine issues arising out of the
Satyam episode and to make suitable recommendations. CII Sets Up Task Force on
Corporate Governance, Business Standard, Jan. 12, 2009; (ii) the National Association
of Software and Services Companies [hereinafter "NASSCOM"], the premier trade

body representing Indian IT - BPO industry announced that it will be forming a
Corporate Governance and Ethics Committee to be chaired by Mr. N. R. Narayana
Murthy, Chairman and Chief Mentor, Infosys Technologies Ltd. This signifies
NASSCOM's efforts to strengthen corporate governance practices in the Indian
IT-BPO industry. NASSCOM Announces Formationof CorporateGovernance and Ethics

Committee, Business Standard, Feb. 11, 2009; and (iii) the Minister for Corporate
Affairs, Government of India announced that the Ministry will consider changes to
the Companies Bill, 2008 (that is pending in Parliament) in the light of events
143

surrounding Satyam. Satyam Scam: Provisions of New Companies Bill to be Reviewed,
THE HINDU BUSINEss LNE, Jan. 8, 2009.
See, Pratip Kar, Enron? Parmalat?Lehman? No, no, it's Satyam, THE BUSINESS STANDARD,
Jan. 9, 2009; Salil Tripathi, India Faces an 'EnronMoment', THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Jan.
9, 2009. It is ironical that Satyam was the recipient of the Golden Peacock Award for
excellence in corporate governance in 2008 conferred upon it by the U.K.-based

World Council for Corporate Governance. The award to Satyam was subsequently
withdrawn when non-disclosure of material facts came to light. Satyam Stripped Off
Golden Peacock Award, THE ECONoMic TIMES, Jan. 7, 2009. An additional question that
has baffled observers pertains to how Satyam was able to circumvent the onerous
provisions of SOX that were applicable to it by virtue of its cross-listing on NYSE,
and the consequent operation of the bonding thesis. For an introduction to the
bonding thesis that arises out of cross-listings, see, Licht, supra note 44, at 142. However,
at an academic level, there are some challenges to the bonding thesis. Licht argues
that the role of the bonding thesis has been greatly overstated. He adds:
A large body of evidence, using various research methodologies, indicates
that the bonding theory is unfounded. Indeed, the evidence supports an
alternative theory, which may be called "the avoiding hypothesis". To the extent
that corporate governance issues play a role in the cross-listing decision, it is a
negative role. The dominant factors in the choice of cross-listing destination
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In this context, it would be relevant to discuss at least two of the failures
that occurred at Satyam from a corporate governance perspective. First, there
was a clear failure of the audit process as the genesis of the fraud can be pointed
to the misstatement of financial information. The Indian corporate governance
norms for audit provide for three basic sets of checks and balances in the audit
process: they are internal audit, statutory audit and the audit committee.14 4
However, despite the existence of such systems within Satyam (at least at a formal
level), the falsification of accounts of such great magnitude continued unabatedly
for several years prior to the Chairman's confession. 145 Even the review by external
reputational intermediaries such as a "Big 4" accounting firm was not capable of
detecting the accounting malfeasance."
Second, the independent directors of Satyam were unable to prevent the
falsification. Various reasons can be attributed to this failure. No doubt, the Satyam
board was largely independent and also comprised distinguished and reputable
individuals."' But, independent directors cannot generally be expected to uncover
frauds in companies as the decisions they make are generally based on information
provided to them by management.14 8 Even in Satyam's own case, independent

145

markets are access to cheaper finance and enhancing issuer visibility. Corporate
governance is a second-order consideration whose effect is either to deter
issuers from accessing better-regulated markets or to induce securities
regulators to allow foreign issuers to avoid some of the more exacting domestic
regulations. Overall, the global picture of cross-listing patterns is best described
as a model of informational distance, which comprises elements of geographical
and cultural distance.
See, R. Sinha & N. Joshipura, The Great Deception, ASIALAw, Feb. 2009, at 24.
One of the significant heads of falsification involves non-existent deposits of Satyam
with its bankers. It is generally believed that cash or bank audits are most basic
and that auditors generally rely on certification received from bankers as to the
existence of cash deposits. Although the matter is under investigation, available
reports indicate that there may have been forgery involved in the certification of
bank deposits. G. Anand & R. Guha, Satyam Bank Documents at Issue, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL, Jan. 21, 2009.

1 6 However, the question of complicity of the
PriceWaterhouseCoopers is yet under investigation.
147

relevant partners

of

As one report describes:

The independent directors on the board included Vinod K Dham (famously known
as 'father of Pentium' and an ex-Intel employee), M Rammohan Rao (Dean of
Indian School of Business), V S Raju (former director of IIT Delhi), TR Prasad

1s

(former union cabinet secretary), M Srinivasan (retired professor from many US
universities) and Krishna Palepu (Professor at the Harvard Business School).
A. K. Bhattacharyya, Satyam: How Guilty are the Independent Directors?, BUSINESS
STANDARD, Jan. 12, 2009.
The management or controlling shareholders control the "amount, quality and
structure" of information that is provided to the board, and this "kind of power over
informationflow is virtuallyequivalent to power over decision". MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE
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directors did raise several questions regarding the proposed acquisition by
Satyam (only a few days prior to the Chairman's confession) of two related entities
carrying on real estate business, namely Maytas Properties and Maytas Infra,
but that did not prevent the board from unanimously resolving to proceed with
the transaction. 4 9 It was in fact the strong adverse reaction from investors that
stalled that proposed transaction.' At a structural level, independent directors
are subject to nomination, appointment and removal, all at the hands of the
controlling shareholders,"' and hence may be subject to influence by the
controlling shareholders.152 Although Satyam was subject to the listing
requirements of NYSE, it did not have an independent nomination committee 54
that could have potentially brought the appointment of directors outside the
purview of the controlling shareholders.5 5 Furthermore, the Indian corporate
governance norms do not specify the roles of independent directors. It is not
STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 144, 172 (Beard Books, 1976). Added to
that is the complexity of the information based on which directors are required to

1

decide. Often, directors' roles are "predicated on a detailed knowledge of a company and
its business-"_ JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF
AMERICA'S CORPORATE BoAms 57 (Harvard Business School Press, 1989).
N. Sheth & J. Range, Satyam Minutes Show Directors Raised Questions, WALL STREET
Jan. 19, 2009. The proposed transaction came under severe criticism as
the board permitted Satyam not only to venture into an unrelated business by
acquiring the Maytas companies, but also allowed Satyam to transact with
shareholders of those companies that were predominantly the Raju family (and
hence constituting related parties) in a manner not entirely transparent to investors.
Within 24 hours of announcement of the Maytas deal, investors forced a reversal
of the proposal through a significant decline (of about 50%) in the price of Satyam's
American depository receipts (ADRs). A. Garg, Lessons from the Satyam-Maytas
Deal, HINDU BUSINEss LINE, Dec. 22,2008.
See, supra notes 84 to 86 and accompanying text.
To be sure, this is not to suggest any malfeasance on the part of Satyam's
independent directors. The independent may act well-intentioned and bona fide,
but due to the operation of several constraints on time, information, as well as on
business, financial and legal expertise, they may not be in a position to challenge
JOURNAL,

'5o

1'
152

management or controlling shareholders when required. An observation made
several years ago by a leading commentator on board behavior continues to be

apt even today: ""Professional courtesy" and "corporate manners" were phrases used to
explain the lack of challengingquestions". MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 54
153

(Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard
University, 1971).
Satyam's ADRs are listed on the NYSE. Symbol: SAY. For further details, see, http:/

/www.nyse.com/about/listed/say.html.
Satyam did not constitute a nomination committee even though that is mandated
by the corporate governance requirements of the NYSE. NYSE Listed Company
Manual, supra note 110, § 303A.04 (2003). See, Form 20-F filed by Satyam with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on Aug. 8, 2008, at 70.
155 For a previous discussion on the importance of this feature, see, supra note 110 and
accompanying text.
15
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entirely clear whether independent directors ought to act as advisors to the
management from a business strategy perspective or whether they ought to act
as a guardian of shareholder interest."' The Indian corporate governance norms
such as Clause 49 only provide a negative definition of independence,15 but do
not specify any positive qualities, a specific role or other attributes for independent
directors. Such lack of clarity in their roles could result in less desirable outcomes
from independent director action as we have witnessed in Satyam's case. Lastly,
the Satyam episode is also symptomatic of a signaling problem with the role of
independent directors. That is, the corporate governance norms bestow too much
(and somewhat misplaced) importance on the role of independent directors than is
justified. In epitomizing independent directors as a guardian of minority
shareholders, the corporate governance norms create a false sense of security among
corporate stakeholders. However, as the Satyam episode has demonstrated, the
independent directors are constrained in the extent to which they can be effective
in unearthing frauds, even by exercising a fair amount of diligence in their action.
Beyond the two specific failures of the audit process and board
independence, there exists the larger issue of promoter control in Indian
companies. Promoters (who are controlling shareholders) exercise significant
influence on matters involving their companies, even though such companies are
listed on stock exchanges and hence have public shareholders. Indian law confers
some distinct roles for promoters.' 8 This largely holds good even for companies
that have controlling shareholders with small percentage holdings in companies.
For instance, the Raju family who are the promoters of Satyam held only about
156

157

158

Several independent directors I interviewed in the course of another study on
board independence in India believe that their primary role on corporate boards
is to provide strategic inputs to management and do not believe they have any
significant role to play in acting as a constant check on management or controlling
shareholders or in preventing frauds or similar corporate governance failures.
Clause 49(I)(A)(iii) of the Listing Agreement lists out persons who do not qualify to
become an independent director of a listed company.
The importance of the position emanates in the context of public offerings of
securities, where the role of key persons involved in control of the company is
material information that is to be disclosed to investors to enable them to take an
informed investment decision. Apart from that, promoters are required to hold

minimum number of shares in the company at the time of listing (also known as
minimum promoter contribution) and they are subject to lock-in on their shares. It
has been argued that "[any requirement that statutorily forces a promoter to bring in
specific investment amounts or maintain specific shareholdingwould necessarily perpetrate
the unfortunate reality of keeping our listed companies in the hands of the promoters". S.
Sundaresan, SEBI Should Phase Out 'Promoter' Concept, BUSINEss STANDARD, Oct. 8, 2007.
This would arguably inhibit any transition from controlling shareholding in
companies (i.e., the insider system) to diffused shareholding (i.e., the outsider
system) so as to engender board-driven-professionally-managed companies.
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5% shares around the time when the Chairman's confession was made on January
7, 2009."' A company with 5% promoter shareholding will usually be considered
as belonging to the outsider model in terms of diffused shareholding, and hence
requiring the correction of agency problems between shareholders and
managers.'6 0 However, the gradual decrease in controlling shareholders'
percentage holdings coupled with the concept of "promoter" under Indian
regulations makes the distinction between an insider-type company and outsidertype company somewhat hazy in the Indian context. The Raju family, as
promoters, continued to wield significant powers in the management of the
company despite a drastic drop in their shareholdings over the last few years.
This was aided by the diffused nature of the remaining shareholding within the
company.'6 ' The Satyam episode illustrates that a company with minimal
promoter shareholding could still be subject to considerable influence by the
promoters, thereby requiring a resolution of the agency problems between
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders even at those shareholding

159

It has been reported that the promoters' percentage shareholding in Satyam
declined over a period of time:
Though the precise numbers quoted vary, according to observers the stake of

the promoters fell sharply after 2001 when they held 25.60 per cent of equity in
the company. This fell to 22.26 per cent by the end of March, 2002, 20.74 per
cent in 2003, 17.35 per cent in 2004, 15.67 per cent in 2005, 14.02 per cent in 2006,
8.79 in 2007, 8.65 at the end of September 2008, and 5.13 per cent in January
2009 (Business Line, January 3, 2009). The most recent decline is attributed to the
decision of lenders from whom the family had borrowed to sell the shares that
were pledged with them. But the earlier declines must have been the result
either of sale of shares by promoters or of sale of new shares to investors.

C.P. Chandrasekhar, The Satyam Scam: Separating Truth from Lies, THE HINDU, Jan. 14,

160
161

2009. It would be cumbersome to obtain the exact amount of voting shares held by
the promoters as large parts of those shares were pledged to lenders and those
pledges were enforced by the lenders during the few months surrounding the
revelation of misstatements in Satyam's financial information, thereby bringing
the promoter holdings down to negligible levels.
See, supra Part IA.
Although institutional shareholders (particularly foreign institutional investors)
are beginning to hold significant number of shares in Indian listed companies,
they have refrained from exercising significant influence over corporate
decisionmaking. Collective action problems continue to operate and, over a period

of time, "the culture of institutional shareholders always blindly voting with the promoter
was established". A. Shah, Getting the Right Architecture for Corporate Governance,
FINANCIAL EXPREss, Jan. 13, 2009. In Satyam's case, institutional shareholders held a
total of 60% shares as of Dec. 31, 2008; the highest individual shareholding of an
institutional shareholders, however, was only 3.76%. This information has been
extracted from Satyam's filing of shareholding pattern with the BSE for the quarter
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levels.1 62 The transition of companies from the insider model to the outsider model
through constant dilution of shareholding by controlling shareholders can be
difficult, as Satyam demonstrates. Corporate governance regimes in emerging
markets such as India which are likely to witness such transition from insider to
outsider regimes through dilution of controlling shareholding need to provide
mechanisms to tackle undue control by promoters with limited shareholding.'
The Satyam case clearly demonstrates the inability of the existing corporate
governance norms in India to deal with corporate governance failures in familycontrolled companies, even where the level of promoter shareholding is relatively
low. Any reforms that spring from this case ought to take into account the
vulnerability of minority shareholders in such companies that lie at the cusp of
insider and outsider systems.

162

ended Dec. 31, 2008, available at http://www.bseindia.com/shareholding/
shareholdingPattern.asp?scripcd=500376&qtrid=60.
In the U.S., hedge funds and other institutional shareholders effectively monitor
and sometimes agitate against inefficient boards and managements and also
help shape general corporate governance norms. They are ably aided by proxy
consultants such as RiskMetrics (previously known as ISS) to build coalitions of
institutional investors to adopt an "activist" role in companies. The absence of
these checks and balances in the Indian context confers unhindered powers to
controlling shareholders or promoters (including those with limited shareholding
percentages) to wield significant influence over corporate decisionmaking. The
"transplantation" of investor activism from developed markets such as the U.S.
and yet to find an entrenched position in the Indian corporate milieu, although
signs of activist investors in India are slowing beginning to emerge. This tepid
involvement of investors in corporate governance of Indian companies has also
been a subject matter of empirical studies. See, Geis, supra note 45.
Observers believe that companies with controlling shareholders holding limited
stakes can be particularly vulnerable to corporate governance failures. As Ajay
Shah, a noted Indian economist states: "The incentive for theft [in such cases] is the
greatest: there is a great temptationfor a CEO who owns 8% of a company to make a grab
for 100% of the cashflow". Further, promoters who are in the twilight zone of control,

i.e., where they hold shares less than that required to comfortably exercise control
over the company, have perverse incentives to keep the corporate performance
and stock price of the company at high levels so as to thwart any attempted
takeover of the company. The following statement by Ramalinga Raju is emblematic
of how this incentive operates: "As the promoters held a small percentage of equity, the
concern was that poor performance would result in a take-over, thereby exposing the gap. It
was like riding a tiger, not knowing how to get off without being eaten" Chairman's
i63

Confession, supra note 133.
There is an argument that if there is to be a smooth transition towards an outsider
regime and "[ijf SEBI truly desires the Indian market to have board-driven-professionallymanaged companies, it should begin by considering a roadmapto do away with the "promoter"
concept over time". Sundaresan, supra note 158. See also, Cheffins, supra note 58.
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REPEATS ITSELF: WITHER GOVERNANCE?

In a provocatively titled booki" Francis Fukuyama argues that the advent
of Western liberal democracy may signal the end point of mankind's ideological
evolution and the final form of human government. But, of immediate interest to
us is a debate in corporate governance that takes a leaf out of Fukuyama's book. In
an article, The End ofHistoryforCorporateLaw, Professors Hansmann and Kraakman
set the framework for the current global corporate governance debate, where
their argument is twofold: (1) American corporate governance has reached an
optimally efficient endpoint by adopting the shareholder primacy and dispersed
shareholding corporate model, and (2) the rest of the world will inevitably follow,
resulting in a convergence of corporate governance around the world on the lines
of the U.S. model. Although these arguments have been subject to a fair amount of
criticism,1 6 6 events that have occurred in the recent months expose chinks in the
U.S. model of corporate governance, and provide at least some anecdotal evidence
1 7
that the success of such model is questionable. 1
The question that is being posed is: where was corporate governance when
the CEOs and boards of directors of large and admired U.S. corporations such as
Bear Steams, Lehman Brothers, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, Merrill Lynch and AIG
saw the performance of their companies plummet, which finally resulted in a
massive erosion of value to their shareholders and other stakeholders?"' Going
back into (recent) history, this is indeed not the first time that such questions
have been posed. Earlier at the turn of this century, we witnessed the very same
16'

FRANcIs FuluAmA, THE END oF HisroRY AND THE LAST MAN (The Free Press, 1992).

165

H. Hansmann & R. Kraakman, supra note 47.
See, Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 48 (arguing that divergence is likely to continue
owing to path dependency); W. Bratton & J. A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate

166

Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38
CoLuM. J.TRAN'L L. 213,213 (1999) (noting that "neitherglobal convergence thateliminates
systemic differences nor the emergence of a hybrid best practice safely can be projected
because each nationalgovernance system is a system to a significant extent"); T. Khanna
et al, Globalization and Similarities in Corporate Governance:A Cross-Country Analysis,
88(1) REv. EcoN. STAT. 69, 84 (2006) (concluding that "globalization may have induced the
adoption of some common corporategovernance standards but that there is little evidence
that these standards have been implemented").
167 The U.S. model of corporate governance has been subject to criticism at two
distinct stages in the recent past. The first occurred when the Enron fraud came to
light at the turn of the century, which was met with swift reaction by the regulators
in terms of the enactment of SOX. The other occurred more recently with the
onset of the global financial crisis and the collapse of financial giants such as Bear
Stearns, Lehman Brothers and AIG which raises doubts regarding the efficacy
168

strengthened regime under SOX.
Supra note 13.
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questions being asked when a governance crisis of a slightly different nature
occurred with Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and other companies being mired in
accounting scandals."' Following this, stem legislative measures were introduced
in the U.S. in the form of SOX that required companies listed in the U.S. to put in
place strong systems and practices to enhance corporate governance." However,
those measures have apparently been insufficient to deal with the current crisis.17 '
In this Part, I explore some of the factors involving U.S. corporate
governance that may have triggered this situation,17 and also argue in favour of
my second assertion that corporate governance norms followed in the U.S. and
U.K. have themselves not been effective in preventing mass failures in corporate
governance, and hence their efficacy may be in doubt in the Indian context.

A. Key Factors in U.S. Corporate Governance
It is useful here to explore some of the factors involving U.S. corporate
governance that may have led to the current situation.
1. Dispersed Shareholding and Lack of Oversight
As we have seen, one of the key problems involving a dispersed
shareholding model (that is prevalent largely in the U.S. and U.K.) is that the
individual shareholders have relatively small stakes in companies and these do
169

See, C. M. Elson & C. J. Gyves, The Enron Failure and Corporate Governance Reform, 38
REv. 855 (2003), D. M. Branson, Enron -When All Systems Fail: Creative
Destruction of Roadmap to CorporateGovernance Reform?, 48 VLL. L. REv. 989 (2003).
See also, NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 110; and NASDAQ Rules, supra

WAKE FoREsT L.
C70

note 110.
Minow, an influential corporate governance activist and commentator,
observes:

171Nell

Despite the post-Enron adoption of the most extensive protections since the

New Deal, a survey released this week by Kroll and the Economist Intelligence
Unit found that corporate fraud rose 22 percent since last year.
The option back-dating and sub-prime messes show that even the post-Enron
Sarbanes-Oxley reform law and expanded enforcement and oversight cannot
eliminate the severest threats to our markets and our economy.
This proves that there are limits to structural solutions. Ultimately, markets are
smarter and more efficient than regulation. What the government needs to do
now is insist on removing obstacles to the efficient operation of market oversight.
Nell Minow, Commentary, Blame Boards of Directorsfor FinancialMess, CNN, Sep. 18,

172

2008, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/09/18/minow.pay/
index.html.
Although the focus of this Part is on U.S. corporate governance, a large number of
the general features of U.S. corporate governance can be found in U.K. as well.
However, the current corporate governance failures have affected the U.S. more

severely than they have the U.K.
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not provide sufficient incentives for them to come together and form coalitions to
effectively oversee the managers of companies." While the shareholders are
owners of the company, the control of the company is vested with the managers,
as shareholders are unable to participate in decision-making due to collective action
problems." That bestows managers with a free hand in the way they manage
companies without substantial oversight from shareholders. On the other hand, it
is also necessary to acknowledge the strong trend of activist investors (such as
hedge funds) to systematically engage in monitoring and oversight of company
management. 75 Such investors are also aided by proxy consultants that put together
voting guidelines based on corporate governance policy positions which have
the effect of shaping corporate governance norms across U.S. corporations.1 7 1
2. Director Primacy and Managerial Superiority
Due to the problems discussed above, managers are not only in a position
to control the business policies of the company, but effectively also the composition
of the board itself. Shareholders usually vote on a slate of directors provided by
management, and they do not possess adequate powers to replace the board or
management.177 This situation is further aggravated due to defenses such as
staggered boards and poison pills, which make it difficult for shareholders (or
even hostile raiders) to unseat the incumbent boards and management.1 7 All of
these enable self-perpetuation of management with little fear of being overthrown
17

"

17

76
177

178

For a detailed discussion of this issue in the context of outsider systems of corporate
governance, see, supra Part IHA.
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These problems are exacerbated by the heterogeneity of interests and differing
levels of information available with these shareholders. See, S. M. Bainbridge, Director
Primacy: The Means and Ends of CorporateGovernance, 97 Nw. U.L. REV. 547, 557 (2003).
J. H. Biggs, ShareholderDemocracy: The Roots of Activism and the Selection of Directors,
39 Loy. U. Ci. L.J. 493 (2008); Kuang-Wei Chueh, Is Hedge Fund Activism New Hope for
the Market?, 2008 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 724.

See, e.g., RiskMetrics, details available at http://www.riskmetrics.com.
See, L. A. Bebchuk, The Casefor IncreasingShareholderPower, 118 HARv. L. REV. 833, 85161(2005).
See, Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards,
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Takeovers, and Why?-The PeculiarDivergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95
GEo. L.J. 1727, 1734-35 (2007) (observing that "[m]anagers of a target company are

permitted to use a wide variety of defenses to keep takeover bids at bay. ... The managers of
a company that has both a poison pill and u staggered board of directors have almost

complete discretion to resist an unwanted takeover bid"). Note, however, that takeover
defenses such as the poison pill and staggered boards have been on the decline in
recent years due to the increasing influence of activist investors. See, T. W. Briggs,
Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An Empirical Analysis, 32 J.
CORP. L. 681, 697-98 (2007).
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even in the wake of dismal performance. For these reasons, although the U.S.
model of corporate governance is known as the "shareholdermodel", in reality there
is very little that shareholders can do to constrain managerial misdeeds.'
3. Pay without Performance
Excessive managerial influence also extends to fixing managers' own
remuneration. Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried state that managerial
influence can lead to inefficient arrangements and perverse incentives in fixing
managerial remuneration that make the amount and performance-insensitivity
of pay less transparent. 80 These have resulted in CEOs and other senior officers
of large U.S. corporations being paid colossal sums of money that do not
necessarily correlate with the performance of the company or the value created
(or destroyed) for shareholders. Golden parachute arrangements ensure that
CEOs obtain large payments even when their services are terminated for poor
performance.'"' With the onset of the financial crisis, however, certain restrictions
have been placed on the ability of managements to award significant sums of
money as compensation to its executives, more specifically in case of companies
8 2
that are the beneficiaries of bailouts by the U.S. Government.1
Unrestrained arrangements for pay, whether in the form of salary, bonus
or even stock options encourage short-termism that incentivize managers to
boost short-term profits of their companies and earn large sums of moneys, but
at the cost of the interests of shareholders that tend to be relatively longer term.'
This mismatch of expectations and incentives causes managers to take decisions
that may in the end prove to be overly risky to shareholders as we have seen in
the recent failures.
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Bebchuk, supra note 177. Again, this principle is subject to some dilution more
recently in view of investor activism. See, Briggs, supra note 178.
L. BEBCHUK & J. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION (Harvard University Press, 2004).
J. W. Markham, Regulating Excessive Executive Compensation-Why Bother? 2 J. Bus. &
TECH. L. 277, 291-93 (2007).

Under the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) Capital Purchase Program,
participating companies are required to "adopt the Treasury Department's standards
for executive compensation and corporategovernance,for the period during which Treasury
holds equity issued under this program" U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury
Announces TARP Capital Purchase Program Description, Press Release HP-1207, Oct.
14, 2008, available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hpl207.htm. Furthermore,
the U.S. President announced the setting up of "new rules for companies receiving
"exceptional assistance" from the government [that] include a $ 500,000 cap on salariesfor
senior executives (compensation beyond that must be in restrictedstock), expanded bans on

golden parachutes, and increases to "clawback" provisions" The White House, Remarks
by the President on Executive Compensation, Feb. 4, 2009, available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/blog-post/new-rules/.
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Furthermore, the remuneration of directors and senior managers is fixed
by the board (or compensation committee), with no approval required from
shareholders for fixing such remuneration." In other words, shareholders have
no "say on pay" that is mandated by law, although there are proposals on the
cards for requiring shareholder approval (at least on a non-binding basis).8
4. Lack of Responsiveness on the Part of Boards
The recent events have questioned the effectiveness of boards of directors
in curbing excessive risk-taking by managers, especially in the case of complex
financial transactions that led to the current financial crisis.1"' The boards
seemingly failed to oversee the actions of the company executives. That also leads
to the issue of the types of individuals who served on the boards of these companies.
Obviously, many of them were independent directors, but not perhaps eminently
suited for the position and for the roles they were expected to discharge." Surely,
these were highly accomplished individuals, but whether they were suited for
the job is a different question altogether. Board independence does not seem to
have instilled a strong level of monitoring on such boards.
5. Combined Roles of Chairman and CEO
Even the apparently onerous provisions of SOX have failed to address one
key issue: there is no mandatory separation of the Chairman and CEO on U.S.
corporate boards.' 8 Most companies still have the same individual occupying
the post of the Chairman and CEO.189 That places such individual in a powerful
18
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A news-report discusses the composition of the Lehman board:
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financial policies and practices, is chaired by Henry Kaufman, the respected
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executive, is the only Lehman external director who has recently run a bank.
But he did not sit on any board committees.
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position, which allows for little transparency into such individual's acts, as they
can go unmonitored until they reach irreversible proportions. On the other hand,
separation of these roles and having two separate individuals serve as Chairman
and CEO allows the chair to serve as a constraint on the CEO, thereby providing
checks and balances that result in better shareholder value. Although other
jurisdictions such as the U.K. have long been practising the separation of these
roles,o this is not mandated in the U.S., and despite several calls from corporate
activists for such separation, that has not received due attention yet.
These are some of the plausible reasons for governance failures in the U.S.
in the recent financial crisis. 9'

B. Key Factors in Indian Corporate Law and Governance
As we have already seen, there are significant differences in corporate
structures and governance between the U.S. and India.19' In India, companies
predominantly display concentrated shareholding structures (as opposed to the
diffused shareholding structures in the U.S.). Most Indian companies have a
controlling shareholder (or group of shareholders). Most of them are business
families. In fact, it has been stated that a "glance at India's 500 most valuablecompanies,
that together accountforover90% ofthe marketcapitalizationof the Bombay Stock Exchange,
reveals that about two-thirds of them arepart ofconglomerates or "businessgroups"""'.On
the other hand, there are hardly a few companies listed in India that do not have
a shareholder or group exercising control over the company. This concept of a
controlling shareholder is further reinforced by the Indian legal regime as well.
For instance, the concept of a "promoter" that is prevalent in various Indian
regulations does just that. 94
190

U.K. Financial Reporting Council, The Combined Code on Corporate Governance, I[ A.2

(Jun. 2008) (stating that "[t]here should be a clear division of responsibilitiesat the head of
the company between the runningof the board and the executive responsibilityfor running of

the company's business. No one individual should have unfettered powers of decision").
191 An additional factor that has been attributed for the governance lapses relates to

the failure of the risk management system within the companies and lapses in
board oversight of risk functions. As one leading U.S. law firm notes:
Risk from the financial services sector has contributed to large-scale bankruptcies,
bank failures, government intervention and rapid consolidation. ... In addition,
the public and political perception that undue risk-taking has been central to the
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What then is the relevance of concentrated shareholding in the context of
governance of companies in India? I now turn to the corporate governance factors
discussed earlier 9 5 in the background of the financial crisis that originated in
the U.S.:
1. No Separation of Ownership and Control
In India, controlling shareholders do have a say in the management and
control of the company. Often, controlling shareholders themselves are managers.
Alternatively, and by virtue of their shareholding, they do possess the power to
appoint their own representatives as managers. Due to their controlling stake,
they take a greater role in assessing the performance of the company and are
usually in control of the management in companies as active (as opposed to
passive) investors. It is arguable that such direct oversight by controlling
shareholders benefits all investors. The problems arising from the separation of
ownership and control ought not to appear here.96
2. Lack of Director Primacy or Managerial Superiority
Unlike in the U.S., Indian boards are amenable to the wishes of the
shareholders. Directors can be appointed and even removed, all through a simple
majority as these decisions are required to be taken merely by ordinary resolutions
at a shareholders' meeting.19 7 Where directors or senior management do not
demonstrate performance, they are liable to be removed by the controlling
shareholders. This ensures that there is absence of self-perpetuation on the part
of the incumbent board and managers.
3. Managerial Pay
The remuneration of directors and senior managers in Indian companies
are not comparable to the kind of proportions witnessed in the U.S., although
Indian pay-scales at the top echelons have seen a steady increase over the years.9
However, the key difference in India (at least in theory) is that senior management's
pay is subject to shareholders' approval and also to certain maximum limits in
view of sections 309100 and 1982, Companies Act, 1956. To that extent, shareholders
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Concentrated ownership itself acts as a disciplining mechanism in countries where
enforceable legal protection of investors is weak. This may help in monitoring
managers, but may not entirely protect the interests of minority shareholders.
See, Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 88, at 754-55, Sarkar & Sarkar, supra note 66.
Supra notes 84 and 85 and accompanying text.
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Section 198 stipulates the maximum amount of managerial remuneration payable
by a company.
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do have a "say on pay" that is mandated by law, unlike in other markets (such as
the U.S.) where the decision is largely left in the hands of the boards of directors
or their compensation committees.
4. Board Oversight
Unlike the U.S. boards which place a lot of emphasis on board independence,
Indian boards consist of a mix of inside directors (such as representatives of the
promoters) and outside directors (such as independent directors). This is likely to
ensure greater discussion and participation on boards as compared to boards
which are loaded with independent directors who tend not to have adequate
information so as to participate effectively, and this is especially so during periods
of crises as currently witnessed by several U.S. financial institutions.201

5. Chairman and CEO
On this count, neither the U.S. nor India mandatorily requires a separation
of the position of Chairman and CEO. However, in practice, it is found that more
Indian companies follow the separation than do the U.S. companies. 20 2 Hence, in
the Indian context, non-executive chairmen of several companies do play a
significant role in stimulating more open discussions on boards and also acting
as a check on the management of the company (such as the CEO/managing director
and other senior managers).
In sum, this points to the fact that the current corporate governance norms
in the U.S. have not been successful in preventing corporate governance failures,
and further goes to show that it may not be entirely efficacious for other countries
such as India to adopt concepts from the U.S. when their own economies may not

only have different corporate governance structures but also other checks and
balances that may possibly tackle at least some of the governance issues.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Over the last decade, giant strides have been taken by the Indian industry
as well as its securities regulator, SEBI, to enhance measures of corporate
governance in India. These developments have closely followed efforts in other
jurisdictions such as the U.K. (the Cadbury Committee Report) and the U.S. (SOX).
Globalization and internationalisation of capital markets are said to be the driving
201
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47

Vol. 21(1)

NationalLaw School ofIndia Review

2009

forces behind this phenomenon. While enhanced measures of corporate
governance will only augur well for the Indian industry and perhaps also be
reflected in firm values,20 these measures do not recognize the differences between
the outsider systems of corporate governance (such as the U.S. and U.K.) from
which concepts such as independent directors, audit committee and CEO/CFO
certification have emerged, and the insider systems of corporate governance (such
as India) into which they have been transplanted. Unless these differences are
factored in by the regulators, courts, industry and academia, there would likely
be difficulties in implementation of the enhanced corporate governance measures
(reflected in Clause 49) and their assimilation within the Indian corporate ethos.
Furthermore, the recent corporate governance failures in the U.S. and U.K. are
evidence of inadequacies in those regimes, and hence the efficacy of their concepts
of corporate governance to Indian circumstances is in considerable doubt.
To be sure, this Article is not intended to make a case against enhanced
corporate governance measures. We are far down the path from that. What it
does is to question the fit of the current measures with the Indian corporate
structure and governance system. Because this Article's main focus is to identify
and deliberate on the differences between various systems of corporate governance
and to undertake a comparative study with reference to the U.S. and U.K. on the
one hand and India on the other, it does not attempt to resolve these differences or
to deliberate upon normative ideas that are suitable to India. That will have to
await another day. Greater research is required to identify the specific agency
problems between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders that are
prevalent in the Indian context and to develop academic literature as well as
regulatory solutions to deal with this problem. In insider systems, the essential
role of corporate governance norms should be to remove the governance systems
from the purview of controlling shareholders and place them outside their
influence. In other words, the corporate governance systems ought to be zealously
guarded against "capture" by the controlling shareholders. This is because the
purpose of such systems is to protect the interests of the minority shareholders
against the actions of the controlling shareholders. Towards this end, several
structural changes to India corporate governance norms may be considered during
further research, and Iendeavor to list only a few of them to provide some modest
illumination of the path ahead:
(i) Improve the external audit process by eliminating or mitigating the
influence of the controlling shareholders. The appointment, remuneration
and control of auditors should not be within the influence of the controlling
shareholders;
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(ii)

Reduce the reliance on independent directors in insider systems as a
check on management failures, unless independent directors are
appointed through a larger democratic process that involves close (and
inclusive) participation by minority shareholders;

(iii) Expound the role of the independent directors on boards in insider
systems and clearly elucidate the constituencies they ought to protect,
i.e., including the minority shareholders;
(iv) Dilute the concept of "promoter" under law so as to enable a transition of
companies from the insider model to the outsider model involving
professionally managed companies;
(v) Consider the imposition of fiduciary duties on controlling shareholders
in insider systems (such as India) where such duties do not exist under
current law or are otherwise inadequate; and
(vi) Encourage large investors (such as financial institutions) who are not
controlling shareholders or promoters to take up a more activist role in
corporate governance of Indian companies so as to protect the rights of
minority shareholders; as a corollary, enhance the robustness of remedies
available to minority shareholders, particularly against conduct
involving oppression or mismanagement.
It would augur well if the Indian corporate governance debate were to
transcend beyond conventional wisdom to take into account these distinctive
factors that are characteristic to the agency problems between controlling
shareholders and minority shareholders, rather than to continue to operate
under concepts that relate to the agency problems between shareholders and
managers that are inappropriate to Indian corporate law and governance.
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